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United Nations (UN) Charter Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to take military 
action by air, sea or land if non-armed solutions fail to restore international peace and Article 43 
states that UN members will keep troops and equipment available for the use of the Security 
Council. However, Article 43 never went into effect, leaving the UN without an alternative to 
diplomatic solutions. Canada’s UN representative, Lester Pearson Bowles, proposed instituting 
peacekeeping missions to address this handicap and Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold 
established a peacekeeping framework, which included: agreement from the Security Council, 
agreement by parties involved, readiness of UN members to support mission, and the existence 
of a peace agreement.   However, the UN’s peacekeeping framework is often violated to address 
complex threats to international peace. This thesis will present an analysis of the UN 
peacekeeping framework and the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the UN 
Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) to establish how the conflict in El Salvador and 
Guatemala determined ONUSAL’s and MINUGUA’s missions and how these deviate from the 
UN peacekeeping framework. The purpose of this study is to establish specific modifications that 
must be made to the classic UN peacekeeping framework based on conflict specifics to prevent 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
The United Nations came to life following the devastation of World War I and World 
War II.  To prevent the international community from ever falling into the violence and 
destruction witnessed during these two wars, the international community came together to 
establish an organization that would promote cooperation and diplomacy among states. The 
United Nations Charter came into existence in the San Francisco conference of 1945 under ideals 
of equality for all states, the universality of human rights, development, and the maintenance of 
peace and security. Chapter I of the United Nations Charter states that the purpose of the United 
Nations is: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace (United Nations Charter, 1945). 
 
To accomplish this, the Charter gives the Security Council the responsibility of 
recognizing any potential threats to peace and security and taking appropriate non-armed 
action to address potential threats. If non-armed solutions fail to prevent the threat from 
escalating, the Security Council has the power under the Charter’s Chapter VII Article 42 to 
take further action by “air, sea, or land […] to maintain or restore international peace and 
security” (United Nations Charter, 1945). The UN Charter gave the Security Council enough 
power to prevent any potential challenges to international security and stability from 
escalating. However, the international community never abided by Article 43 where the 
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Charter states that member states should have troops and equipment at the UN’s disposal for 
use at the Security Council’s discretion to address threats to international community:  
All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance 
of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security 
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed 
forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose 
of maintaining international peace and security” (United Nations Charter, 1945; 
Krasno, 2004, p. 225).  
 
As a result, the Security Council was left with the power but not the means to prevent violence 
from escalating and threatening international security.  
To address the organization’s handicap that resulted from the international 
community’s failure to abide by Chapter VII Article 43, Canadian foreign minister and UN 
representative, Lester Bowles Pearson, proposed an armed UN peacekeeping force composed 
of voluntarily contributed forces from member states to address the crisis in the Suez Canal. 
The UN General Assembly approved the Canadian proposal on November 4
th
, 1956, and 
established the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), the UN’s first peacekeeping 
mission to deploy armed forces (Krasno, 2004, p. 230).  To standardize peacekeeping 
operations, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld established a basic peacekeeping 
framework. Hammarskjöld’s peacekeeping guidelines included: agreement from the Security 
Council, agreement by parties involved, readiness of UN members to support the mission, and 
the existence of a peace agreement (Zacarias, 1996, p. 17). Peacekeeping represented a new 
form of conflict resolution in the interest of international peace and security and even though it 
is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, it is understood to be legitimized by Chapters 
VI and VII (Wiseman, 1983, p. 19). UN peacekeeping represented a means by which the 
organization could remain proactively engaged in the maintenance of peace and security, 
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while being legitimized by the support of member states, particularly the Security Council’s 
permanent members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States).  
The UN has deployed sixty-five peacekeeping missions around the world since its 
inception. Today, there are 15 active UN missions, including missions in Africa, Europe, the 
Caribbean and Asia (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). The demand for UN intervention in 
peacekeeping operations over the years has been significant, since the UN often serves as a 
neutral mediator and the simple presence of the international community can play a 
determining role in the maintenance of ceasefires and the prevention of the escalation of 
violence. However, while the need for peacekeeping missions continues to be imperative in 
addressing conflict and threats to security around the world, there is significant skepticism 
regarding the organization’s role in peace operations because of the number of peacekeeping 
missions that have failed to accomplish their goals while often ignoring or even perpetuating 
the realities on the ground. Some of these missions include the UN’s failure to prevent the 
violence in Rwanda from escalating to genocide and the UN mission in Yugoslavia where 
ethnic violence and genocide took place over a three year period with blue helmets on the 
ground. With the growing skepticism of the real successes of UN peacekeeping missions and 
the continued demand for the organization’s intervention, it is imperative to understand what 
contributes to a successful UN peacekeeping mission that results in a successful cease-fire and 
transition to peace and stability.   
Peacekeeping missions that have taken a more comprehensive approach to addressing 
the conflict at hand have historically been more successful since the UN takes an active role in 
peace negotiations, disarmament, transition to peace, and post-conflict peace maintenance and 
4 
 
reconciliation. However, small differences between missions can have determinant roles in the 
mission’s outcome. With this in mind, this thesis will study the role of the United Nations in 
two comprehensive peacekeeping missions where the role of the organization was not limited 
to the supervision of a ceasefire; rather, it was involved in several aspects of the peace process. 
The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the UN Verification Mission in 
Guatemala (MINUGUA) were the first missions to take a comprehensive approach to 
peacekeeping where the UN played a crucial role in the peace process and post-conflict peace 
maintenance. ONUSAL was established before a peace agreement between the Salvadoran 
government and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) was 
reached, forcing the UN to take an active role in peace negotiations, and ONUSAL was 
deployed prior to an agreed cease-fire (Hill & Malik, 1996, p. 71). MINUGUA, like 
ONUSAL, took an active role in the peace negotiations between the Guatemalan government 
and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) and was deployed prior to a 
peace agreement (Rosenthal, 2001, p. 58).  Thus, both UN missions comprehensively 
approached the peace process by brokering the peace negotiations and agreements and 
assisting in the transition to peace by helping build civil society institutions following 
devastating civil wars, while peacekeepers on the ground tried to maintain peace and stability. 
However, ONUSAL is considered to have been relatively successful in achieving these goals, 
while MINUGUA’s successes are considered limited.  
This research will examine the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the UN 
Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) to establish what the differences between the 
two missions were that led to success in El Salvador and failure in Guatemala. These two cases 
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were selected because the author wanted to focus their research on the Latin American region 
and the UN missions in El Salvador and Guatemala are the only two cases of UN intervention in 
the Western Hemisphere with the exception of Haiti. This research will present a qualitative, 
comparative analysis of the role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala, starting 
with a historical background of the conflict and early UN intervention, followed by the UN’s role 
during the conflict and the role of the organization in post-conflict El Salvador and Guatemala 
(including UN’s role in the establishment of the Truth Commission). This thesis will conclude 
with a comparison of ONUSAL and MINUGUA to establish what the factors were that led to 
success in El Salvador and failure in Guatemala to restore stability. Stability will be determined 
through the analysis of the following indicators:  
1. Sustained ceasefire determined by the end of hostilities between warring parties.   
2. The return to civilian rule determined by the holding of regular, free and fair elections,  
3. The existence of political rights as determined by Freedom House’s Freedom in the 
World Survey. 
4. The existence of civil rights as determined by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 
Survey. 
5. Gross National Income (GNI) per capita 
6. Human Development Index (HDI) 
Sources to be used for the development of this study include historical documents including 
General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, statements from the UN Secretary General 
and both peace agreements in combination with existing scholarly research on peacekeeping in 
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general and ONUSAL and MINUGUA in particular. This study will attempt to establish the 
differences between the two missions that led to such distinct outcomes. Such findings are likely 
to contribute to the better understanding of peacekeeping missions, their capabilities and 
limitations, and how to better devise successful, multifaceted missions that promote a successful 
transition from conflict to peace. 
To complete this study, the author will assume that differences between the two missions 
resulted in the different outcomes. The author recognizes that there are other factors that could 
have contributed to stability in El Salvador following the work of ONUSAL and continued 
instability in Guatemala following the work of MINUGUA. The author recognizes that the 
environment in which these peacekeeping missions took place may have contributed to the 
different outcomes and will attempt to address contributing factors outside of the UN 
peacekeeping missions that could have played an important role in facilitating the success of 
ONUSAL and hindering the work of MINUGUA. Some intervening variables that this study will 
consider will include the nature of the conflict (including length and role of third parties), battle 
fatigue, pivotal events during the peace process, the influence of Cold War politics, the role of 
third parties and the public opinion of warring parties, among others.  
The literature on United Nations peacekeeping identifies the origin of this type of 
operation out of necessity. The rise of the Suez Canal conflict led to the UN’s decision to take 
action to maintain the peace agreement reached between the two parties involved and guarantee 
the stability of the region through its involvement. The first UN peacekeeping operation was 
devised by Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson and then Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. 
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Michael Doyle, Robert Orr, Ramesh Thakur, A.B. Fetherston and Jean Krasno outline the 
general guidelines of traditional peacekeeping as established following the Suez Crisis as 
requiring the following conditions:  
1. an agreement by the international community to establish the peacekeeping operation, 
specifically UN Security Council members; 
2. agreement and consent from the parties involved in the conflict to allow for the UN’s 
intervention and peacekeeping force to be established in their territory as a means to 
facilitate the peace process and maintenance;  
3. the willingness of UN members to support the peacekeeping operation through 
financial, human and equipment contributions; and  
4. the pre-existence of a peace agreement between the warring parties, an established 
peace to be maintained.   
Peacekeeping operations represented the most visible representation of the UN’s work 
around the world particularly following the end of the Cold War and attempted to contain and 
stabilize conflicts between and within states until lasting peace could be maintained without the 
UN’s presence (Thakur, 2006, p. 39). However, traditional peacekeeping required very strict 
conditions in order to successfully maintain peace following a conflict between states, conditions 
that were rarely present and led to many failed peacekeeping operations.  
Failed traditional peacekeeping operations led to the establishment of comprehensive 
peacekeeping missions, also known as third generation peacekeeping, peacemaking operations, 
peacebuilding missions, or multidimensional peacekeeping operations. As described by the 
literature, these operations still required the support of UN members in general and Security 
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Council members in particular as well as the willingness from the international community to 
provide the financial, human and material assets required to perform the mission’s work. 
However, the scope of the missions was significantly more complex. The UN often worked as a:  
facilitator and mediator in the peace process, a peacebuilder between warring parties establishing 
disarmament programs and helping build a civil police force, and as a nation-builder supporting 
the political, institutional and social transformations required to establish long-lasting peace. 
Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert Orr (2007), Agostinho Zacarias (1996), Stephen Hill 
and Shahin Malik (1996) and A.B. Fetherston (1998) describe this evolved form of peacekeeping 
as a more adequate form to manage international conflict and threats to international stability. 
Furthermore, these authors argue that this type of peacekeeping operation where the United 
Nations comprehensively takes part in the peace process often results in more stable post-conflict 
environments. One example used by the literature to represent comprehensive peacekeeping 
missions is the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). 
The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established during the peace 
process led by the United Nations.  Diego Arria outlines in his chapter addressing this issue the 
process by which the United Nations became involved in the peace negotiations, pointing out 
that the parties had taken other attempts at peace prior to UN involvement; however, the results 
had never led to peace between the Salvadorian government and the FMLN (2003, p. 65). 
Kimbra Fishel (1998), Michael Wesley (1997), James Dobbins (2005), and Gerardo Munck 
(1993) present comprehensive studies of the role of the United Nations in establishing and 
maintaining peace in El Salvador, describing ONUSAL as comprehensive and multidimensional, 
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further reinforcing the argument that this UN mission did incorporate peacemaking and 
peacebuilding notions to its peacekeeping mission.   
The literature describing the role of the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala 
(MINUGUA) in the Guatemalan peace process is less prominent. There is ample literature on the 
conflict in Guatemala, the human rights violations that took place, and the findings of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Committee; however, there is an important gap regarding the work of 
MINUGUA. Much of the literature that does mention MINUGUA labels the mission as an 
observer mission that had little influence on the peace process; however, this is somewhat 
inaccurate since the UN mission helped broker the peace between the warring parties, helped 
establish civil institutions and organized and monitored the Truth and Reconciliation Committee. 
The role of the UN in Guatemala was beyond that of an observer. Gert Rosenthal (2001) 
addresses the role of third parties in peace negotiations, outlining the role the UN played. There 
is very limited literature addressing the role of the UN mission as a whole, and its participation in 
post-conflict Guatemala, an important gap in the literature that this study will attempt to address. 
Authors like Elizabeth Oglesby (2007) and Michele Leiby (2009) address the human rights 
violation in their research, however make no significant mention of the United Nations’ role in 
dealing with these violations in post-conflict Guatemala. Susanne Jonas (1996, 2000a, 200b), 
Catherin Nolin Hanlon and Finola Shankar (2000) address the difficulties of institution building 
and reconciliation in post-conflict Guatemala, again only making limited mentions of the role of 
MINUGUA in this area of the peace process.  
There is a significant amount of literature on the United Nations role as peacekeeper and 
more recently its role in comprehensive peacekeeping. The UN mission in El Salvador represents 
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the first manifestation of the UN’s peacekeeping mission in a more comprehensive capacity and 
as such has been the focus of a significant volume of academic literature.  The UN mission in 
Guatemala, on the other hand, has not been as prominent in academic literature; therefore, this 
thesis will attempt to contribute to the current literature on peacekeeping, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding by further analyzing MINUGUA as well as presenting a comparative analysis of 




CHAPTER 2 – UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL 
SALVADOR (ONUSAL) 
Historical Background 
The causes of the Salvadoran civil war can be explained by the country’s socio-economic 
and political structures, which established predominantly exclusionary and socially divisive 
lines. It was these non-inclusive social, economic and political policies that led to the rise of the 
guerrilla movement and socialist ideas that challenged the Salvadoran government and gave way 
to a prolonged and violent civil war that lasted twelve years and resulted with the loss of over 
75,000 Salvadoran lives, immeasurable infrastructure destruction, and a severe deterioration of 
the safety net holding Salvadoran society together. The civil war brought to light the need for 
radical changes in the economic and political realities of El Salvador in order for these to become 
more inclusive and encompassing and to allow for broader more universal participation in the 
economic and political life of the country.    
Social and economic inequalities in El Salvador resulted in a skewed land tenure system 
that limited the livelihood possibilities for non-land tenants in the agrarian sector (Orr, 2001, pp. 
155-7). Cash crops led to massive coffee cultivation for export. Policies supporting coffee 
cultivation led to the displacement of subsistence farmers by expropriating their lands through 
the passing of the Vagrancy Law of 1881 and the Agrarian Law of 1907, forcing peasants to 
become wage-earning farmers or seek new lands to cultivate. Expropriated lands were 
consolidated into large coffee plantations owned by the Salvadoran elite, leaving the majority of 
the country’s peasants landless (Lee, 2010, p. 264). Land tenure in El Salvador was limited to a 
small minority, while the majority of the country’s landless peasants worked for the profit of the 
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affluent minority (Toft, 2010, p. 72). The elitist economic structure worsened an already 
vulnerable peasantry. Peasants under this land arrangement struggled to sustain themselves and 
their families (Pearce, 1997, p. 442). The cash crop approach of the Salvadoran economy forced 
peasants into wage labor, which forced peasants who had once been able to provide for their 
families into poverty and exacerbated the country’s steep inequality.  
By the 1970s, the reality faced by the landless peasantry gave way to the rise of protest 
movements and peasant revolts (Byrne, 1996, p. 17). In the late 1970s, the Salvadoran 
revolutionary movement developed, encompassing a broad, radical and class-based union of the 
disenfranchised, including: peasants, workers, students, teachers, slum dwellers, the unemployed 
and other often included sectors of society (Byrne, 1996, p. 41). Those who had been most 
severely affected by the discriminatory economic system found a common cause in their 
grievances and joined forces to protest the government and its economic and social policies.  
As the violence escalated, the government attempted to introduce agrarian reform to 
mitigate the violence. The reform would attempt to reduce the economic, social and political 
power of the Salvadoran coffee oligarchy by changing the inequitable land-tenure system (Paris, 
2002, p. 49). However, the landowning elite was unwilling to make any economic sacrifices 
(Byrne, 1996, p. 18). The defeat of the agrarian-reform of 1976 demonstrated the strength of the 
land-owning elite and their control over both the government and military (Byrne, 1996, p. 44). 




In March 1980, Archbishop Oscar Romero, a prominent supporter of the peasant 
movement, was assassinated, a crime that was traced back to the Salvadoran government and 
death squads (Munck, 1993, p. 76). The assassination of Archbishop Romero unified the 
opposition and by October of that same year, when it became evident that land and economic 
reform had failed, five communist groups joined forces in a new coalition under the name of the 
Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) (Paris, 2002, p. 49) and escalated 
the violence into a full-scale civil war between the insurgency and the government (Lee, 2010, p. 
263).   
On 1 January 1981, the FMLN launched its biggest offensive to date, considered the 
official start of the civil war. The FMLN experienced few military successes in 1981, forcing the 
insurgency to retreat and call for negotiations (Munck, 1993, p. 78). By the mid-1980s, 
unsuccessful attacks by the FMLN and failed counterinsurgency missions by the military proved 
that neither side was strong enough to militarily defeat the other; however, differences between 
both parties made moving the conflict to the negotiating table difficult. In 1989, Alfredo Felix 
Cristiani, became president of El Salvador.  With a strong governmental and military control, 
Cristiani called for negotiations (Munck, 1993, p. 79). The length of the war can be attributed to 
the parties’ unwillingness to appear weak by acceding to negotiations.  However, given that just 
a few years into civil war both parties were unable to make major military advances, shows that 
the conflict could have moved to the negotiation table at an earlier point.  
The social, political, and economic exclusion of the majority of the population and the 
unwillingness of the ruling class to take significant action to change this reality caused the 
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conflict in El Salvador. Violence in El Salvador was recurrent, resulting from the hardships faced 
by the peasant class in a system that made social mobility practically impossible. The war in El 
Salvador resulted in greater economic hardships during the conflict, with economic indicators 
including per capita income dropping to levels not seen since the 1960s. Furthermore, the 
conflict was the cause of the destruction of important arable land and infrastructure essential to 
the Salvadoran economy. Additionally, the violent nature of the conflict, the systematic violation 
of human rights, and extenuating length of the war had devastating effects on the Salvadoran 
society.  
The UN and Peace Negotiations 
The FMLN’s call for negotiations and the election of President Cristiani helped move 
both parties towards a negotiated solution. The first significant round of negotiations between the 
FMLN and the government was in September 1989 in Mexico City with the United Nations 
(UN), the Catholic Church and the Organization of American States (OAS) as observers. At this 
meeting, the FMLN presented a proposal that would result in a cease-fire by mid-November. The 
next meeting in October 1989 in San Jose, Costa Rica yielded no concrete results because of 
disagreements between the parties (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 141). The bombing of the National 
Federation of Union of Salvadoran Workers on 1 November 1989 in San Salvador drove the 
FMLN away from the negotiating table in protest of the government’s repression (Munck, 1993, 
p. 83). The meetings in Mexico City and San Jose yielded no concrete outcomes and led to the 
FMLN’s largest offensive in November 1989. The FMLN offensive was a turning point because 
it showed the insurgency it had failed to inspire a popular insurrection and, thus, lacked the 
means for a military victory. For the Salvadoran army, the FMLN offensive proved that it was 
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unable to defeat the FMLN (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 417). During the course of the FMLN’s 
offensive, six Jesuit priests and two witnesses were murdered, which caused international outcry 
and demands from the United States (US) for a criminal investigation of the events (Holiday & 
Stanley, 1993, p. 417). Both events made it clear that neither party was capable of victory 
through military means, making negotiations the only viable option to end the war.  
After the FMLN offensive, Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and his personal 
representative, Álvaro de Soto, encouraged both parties to return to the negotiations and meet in 
Geneva in April 1990 (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 418). The Secretary General and his team 
played an indispensable role in bringing both parties back to the peace talks.  In Geneva, the 
FMLN and the government agreed on the agenda and schedule for the negotiation process 
(Munck, 1993, p. 81). This initial meeting outlined the complicated process ahead and the 
difficult issues that the peace process would attempt to tackle in order to reestablish peace in El 
Salvador and create a more stable, inclusive society. The Geneva Accords of 1990 marked the 
first step towards peace (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 418). In Geneva, Secretary General Pérez 
de Cuéllar committed to oversee personally the peace process (Karl, 1992, p. 152). Pérez de 
Cuéllar’s commitment to peace in El Salvador was imperative in keeping both parties at the 
negotiating table and maintaining momentum in the peace process.  
The next meeting took place in Caracas, Venezuela where the issues for upcoming 
negotiations were divided into three stages. The first stage would be the agreement on a political 
accord to lead to a cease-fire, the second stage would include the future of the FMLN and the 
reincorporation of its members into Salvadoran society, and the final stage would be the final 
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peace accords. During the Caracas meeting, both parties agreed that the UN would be the neutral 
party in charge of verifying the peace process (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 419). The agreement 
in Caracas proved that both parties valued and respected the contributions the UN could make to 
the peace process.  
At the next meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, in July 1990, the FMLN and the government 
called for the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). 
In addition, this meeting demanded the immediate respect for human rights (Holiday & Stanley, 
1993, p. 419). The San Jose meeting produced the first substantive agreement in the negotiation 
process, making human rights the core issue of the agreement and granting ONUSAL and the 
UN the authority to act as guarantor and protector of human rights in El Salvador (Montgomery, 
1995a, p. 142). The Secretary General’s representative, Álvaro de Soto, understood the 
importance of keeping the momentum in the negotiations and actively campaigned for the 
agreement to be produced before the conclusion of negotiations (Karl, 1992, p. 156). At the 
meeting, both parties agreed that the UN’s human rights verification work should begin 
following the cease-fire; however, it was later decided that verification should begin immediately 
since an official cease-fire was far from materializing (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 142). The UN 
opened its office in El Salvador in January 1991 and began operations six months later (Holiday 
& Stanley, 1993, p. 419). ONUSAL was the first UN mission to begin its work on the ground 
without a cease-fire, thus, the role of the UN extended beyond that of a traditional peacekeeping. 
This new mission model was groundbreaking and unprecedented because there had been no 
predecessors to this type of UN mission. Moreover, the Salvadoran model presented many 
challenges as the UN explored its role in peace building. 
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Armed forces’ reform caused the peace process to stagnate following the San Jose 
meeting. The FMLN demanded the incorporation of its combatants into the armed forces and the 
purging of officers guilty of human rights violations; requests the government refused. The issue 
of military reform was so polarizing that the negotiations deadlocked and remained so between 
July 1990 and April 1991 (Munck, 1993, p. 81). During this time, the role of the UN as 
negotiator and mediator increased. Álvaro de Soto, was key in getting both parties back to the 
negotiating table and was an important contributor to the terms of the peace process. At the 
request of FMLN leaders, de Soto drafted a proposal for armed forces reform that called for the 
abolition of the state security forces and the military intelligence apparatus, two of the three 
branches of the Salvadoran military (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 143). De Soto’s work was essential 
in moving the peace process forward. The UN at this point was taking a more active role than 
that of a moderator, actively participating in the agreement-writing process. Peace talks finally 
resumed in Mexico City in April 1991, focusing on prospective military, judicial and legislative 
reform. The agreement limited the power of the army to national defense and subordinated the 
armed forces to presidential control. Furthermore, both parties agreed to the creation of a 
national police force (PNC) as a substitute for the military in civil security affairs (Munck, 1993, 
pp. 82-3).  
In September 1991, peace talks resumed in New York City under the auspices of 
Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar; who personally requested the presence of President 
Cristiani. In addition, Pérez de Cuéllar negotiated with the US State Department to guarantee that 
FMLN leaders were granted entry visas to attend the meeting in New York (Montgomery, 1995a, 
p. 144). Both parties were willing to compromise and make concessions, demonstrating their 
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urgency to finalize the agreement. At the New York meeting, the FMLN abandoned its demand 
to incorporate its combatants into the armed forces and instead its combatants were guaranteed 
non-prejudicial access to join the PNC (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 420). During this meeting, 
both parties agreed to the creation of the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace 
(COPAZ), granting the new institution strong legal powers to verify all facets of the execution of 
the peace accords (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 145). The meeting in New York yielded the 
preliminary peace accord, which included: the rights of FMLN members to join the PNC, the 
governments guarantee to allow guerrilla families to keep occupied land, and the purge of the 
military’s officer corps (Munck, 1993, p. 83). Still missing in the preliminary accords was an 
official cease-fire. After the New York meeting, the FMLN unilaterally announced that it would 
suspend all offensive attacks, a decision that was reciprocated by the Salvadoran government.  
Both parties reconvened in New York in December 1991 to agree on a final peace accord. 
Since Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar was due to retire on 31 December 1991, this date 
served as an unofficial deadline (Juhn, 1998, p. 82). Negotiations moved at a much slower pace 
than expected so President Critiani flew to New York to join the peace talks and Secretary 
General Pérez de Cuéllar delayed his departure from New York several times on 31 December 
hoping that his presence could guarantee a successful conclusion to the negotiations 
(Montgomery, 1995a, p. 146).  The agreement was completed on 1 January 1992 and was signed 
on 16 January 1992 at the Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City (Spector B. I., 2011, p. 26).  The 
end of Pérez de Cuéllar’s term caused a sense of urgency in both parties to finish the accords, 
which is a reflection of the role the Secretary General and his office played in the peace process.  
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The Chapultepec Accords presented a detailed plan for the demobilization and FMLN 
combatants, the legalization of opposition parties, the guarantee of free and fair elections, limited 
land reform, investigation of human rights abuses, the professionalization of the judiciary and 
police force, the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control, and the reconstruction of 
physical infrastructure destroyed during the war (Paris, 2002, pp. 49-50). Noticeably missing in 
the peace accords were social and economic issues, which were tackled extremely late in the 
process and were superficially addressed in the agreement because of time constraints (Orr, 2001, 
p. 167). Issues of wider land reform, labor rights and equity were relegated to the Socio-
Economic Forum to be composed of government, business and labor representatives (Stanley, 
2006, p. 109). The lack of socioeconomic reform is by far one of the most significant weaknesses 
of the accords, because inequitable distribution of wealth and power in El Salvador was a major 
contributing factor to the rise of violence before the war.  
Peace negotiations lasted 21 months; the partial agreements were a result of the eagerness 
and strenuous work done by the UN, Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar, and the Secretary 
General’s representatives at the negotiating table. The UN had a clear interest in bringing the 
Salvadoran civil war to an end and it invested time and resources to guarantee peace. The UN’s 
involvement as a mediator evolved into that of an active player, encouraging the participation of 
both parties, proposing solutions to particular issues when the parties were unable to agree, and 
taking an active role in the writing and editing of the peace accords. The role of the UN during 
the peace process broke away from the organization’s traditional constraints in peace 
negotiations and was the precursor of the UN’s peace building mission ONUSAL.  
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The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) 
The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established by the 
Security Council at the Secretary General’s request following the meeting in San Jose, Costa 
Rica in July 1990. The San Jose accords established a multidisciplinary mission with a 
preeminent focus on human rights. ONUSAL was the first post-Cold War UN mission in which 
the organization involved itself in a wide range of activities to support El Salvador’s transition to 
peace (Ozerdem, 2009, p. 65). ONUSAL was the result of the first UN effort to end a civil war; 
it was a pilot mission that did not only attempt to disarm and demobilize the military, but also to 
facilitate national reconciliation (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 146).  ONUSAL’s mission and work 
broke away from the traditional expectations of UN peacekeeping missions, taking a proactive 
role in facilitating and encouraging the Salvadoran peace process.  
In September 1990, ONUSAL opened a preparatory office in San Salvador to begin the 
logistics of the mission prior to its official start date. ONUSAL began its work in January 1991, 
with four officials in the San Salvador office (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 142). ONUSAL’s mandate 
was to observe and supervise the implementation of the peace accords. Originally, the mission 
was scheduled to monitor human rights after the signing of the official cease-fire, however, with 
the prolongation of the peace talks, both parties agreed that ONUSAL could begin monitoring 
human rights immediately. ONUSAL began its work in human rights work in July 1991, six 
months before the official peace accords were signed (Montgomery, 1995b, p. 243). Following 
the Chapultepec Accords, ONUSAL began to operate fully in El Salvador, focusing its work on 
four key areas including: the armed forces, the national civil police force, electoral reform and 
human rights verification (Ozerdem, 2009, p. 56). 
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ONUSAL’s Military Division 
ONUSAL’s military division’s work began with the signing of the cease-fire on 1 
February 1992 and ended on 15 December 1992. The military division’s work extended over a 
period of less than a year while focusing on four pivotal objectives: demobilizing and disarming 
FMLN combatants, reforming the armed forces including reducing its size and dismantling the 
security forces, reestablishing public administration of former conflict zones and assisting with 
mine removal (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 150). It was important that ONUSAL manage the military 
aspects of the peace accords rather than the Salvadoran government so that the FMLN could 
have security guarantees. Furthermore, ONUSAL’s role as a neutral third party gave the mission 
the authority it needed to help the military demobilization process and avoid the resurgence of 
violence. 
ONUSAL’s FMLN demilitarization and demobilization process took place in different 
regions in fifteen designated and supervised concentration zones. The process consisted of 
former FMLN combatants reporting to the concentration zones where they turned in their arms 
and remained in the zone under ONUSAL supervision before being reincorporated to civilian 
life. The goal was to allow FMLN combatants to rejoin civilian life in batches of approximately 
20 percent over five set dates. The arms collected were stored by ONUSAL and destroyed by the 
end of October 1992 (Munck, 1993, p. 84). The demobilization process was complicated; there 
were over 7,000 combatants spread throughout El Salvador. The military capacity and strength 
of the FMLN was a major concern because the guerrilla group had the capabilities to conduct 
major military operations that could derail the peace process, making this a major concern for 
ONUSAL (Dobbins, et al., 2005, pp. 47-8).  
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The peace accords established a strict schedule for the FMLN demobilization and 
demilitarization process, however, abiding by this schedule proved extremely difficult for 
ONUSAL because the schedule set forth by the parties was unrealistic. The lack of infrastructure, 
including a lack of housing and supplies to shelter and feed FMLN combatants in the 
concentration zones, set ONUSAL off to a slow start. Once the logistical and infrastructural 
hurdles were overcome, ONUSAL began the demobilization process in June 1992, two months 
behind the original schedule (Munck, 1993, p. 84). By mid-August, it was evident that the 
original deadline for demobilization was unattainable, therefore, both parties agreed to postpone 
the original deadline of 31October to 15 December 1992 (Munck, 1993, p. 85). ONUSAL 
completed the demobilization and demilitarization on by the established deadline and destroyed 
arms collected. Although the FMLN had been officially demobilized, its reintegration into 
society proved much more difficult and challenging. ONUSAL was not very successful at the 
reintegration process. Challenges in this area included hurdles in land-transfers  because of poor 
coordination with the Salvadoran government, legal complications over title transfers, payment 
delays, and the refusal of landowners to sell their land at the Salvadoran government’s request. 
By 1994, only 40 percent of the land transfers had taken place, leaving 60 percent of FMLN 
combatants landless and with limited possibilities to sustain themselves and their families in 
post-civil war El Salvador (Dobbins, et al., 2005, p. 55). The failure to successfully complete the 
land transfers is an evident failure of ONUSAL and the peace process, one that may prove to be 
even more volatile than expected, especially when considering that the failure to implement 
agrarian reform had been an important cause that led up to the war. In addition to the failure to 
implement the land transfer promised in the agreement, ONUSAL did not have the adequate 
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personnel, tactical mobility or advanced technology to investigate FMLN claims of 
demilitarization and was forced to take the FMLN word as guarantee that the FMLN had indeed 
fully demobilized.  
ONUSAL’s military division was also tasked with establishing an Ad Hoc Commission 
to investigate the officer corps and create a list with the names of officers who had participated 
in human rights violations and would be purged from the armed forces. On 23 September 1992, 
the Ad Hoc Commission submitted their findings with a list of officer names to both President 
Cristiani and Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Munck, 1993, p. 85). Pressure from the 
armed forces high command forced President Cristiani to announce in late October 1992 that he 
would postpone taking action on the Commission’s recommendation until the FMLN’s complete 
demobilization. UN envoys Marrik Goulding and Álvaro de Soto attempted to mediate an 
agreement between the two parties. Finally, both parties agreed that the removal of these officers 
would be announced at the end of November and take effect by 6 January 1993. This new 
schedule made the purge of the officers coincide with the final phase of FMLN demobilization.  
ONUSAL’s military division’s work proved extremely challenging particularly when 
dealing with the Salvadoran armed forces and having them comply with the peace accords. The 
lack of full support from President Cristiani proved to be a challenge, particularly when he 
decided without consulting ONUSAL to delay the purging of officers guilty of human rights 
violations. In trying to demobilize the FMLN, ONUSAL faced logistical difficulties at the 
beginning that were eventually overcome to allow for the process to begin. The overoptimistic 
schedule set forth by the Chapultepec Accords proved to be impossible given the magnitude of 
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the demobilization process. Eventually, the time delays were negotiated with the help of UN 
mediators, which allowed for full demobilization in coordination with the removal of the officers 
listed by the Ad Hoc Commission. In the long-run, the failure to incorporate FMLN ex-
combatants into civil society is likely to prove the most dangerous to stability in El Salvador, 
especially when considering that land-tenure was a major factor that led up to the war in the first 
place.  
ONUSAL’s Police Division 
Prior to the civil war, the armed forces had sole authority over security in El Salvador. 
This concentration of power gave the Salvadoran armed forces too much power that contributed 
to the abuses that took place in the years leading up to the civil war and during the war. With this 
in mind, the Chapultepec Accords outlined the need for the establishment of a national civil 
police force (PNC). ONUSAL’s Police Division began its work on 7 February 1992, following 
the official cease-fire with a force of 315 police observers (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 151). 
ONUSAL was tasked with selecting and training of prospective police officers that could 
administer internal security once ONUSAL’s was completed. ONUSAL faced many difficulties 
because of a lack of commitment from the Salvadoran government, which failed to allocate the 
necessary resources to guarantee the success of ONUSAL’s police division (Holiday & Stanley, 
1993, p. 426). While the PNC was functioning by the end of ONUSAL’s work,  the weaknesses 
of the PNC were evident and led many to fear that the armed forces would take advantage of 
these weakness to regain the power it had lost as a result of the peace accords.  
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ONUSAL’s Electoral Division 
ONUSAL’s mission was expanded in May 1993 to include an Electoral Division to 
oversee the first post-conflict election in El Salvador in March and April 1994. ONUSAL 
assisted and supervised the entire electoral process (Paris, 2002, p. 50). In August 1993, the first 
technical mission arrived and concluded that there were major problems with voter registration 
for ONUSAL to handle. In addition to voter registration, ONUSAL’s mandate included the 
observation of the political campaigns leading up to the election, the supervision of the voting 
procedure to take place during Election Day, and the counting of ballots following the end of 
voting (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 154). The work of the Electoral Division was essential for El 
Salvador’s democratic transition.  
ONUSAL’s Electoral Division divided its work into six stages: logistical organization at 
the central and regional level, verification of voter registration, observation of the electoral 
campaign, observation of election procedures, vote counting, and the announcement of the final 
results (Hampson, 1996a, p. 159). ONUSAL identified several difficulties with voter registration 
and the electoral rosters, which included the large number of names of expatriates or dead 
persons still on the rolls, the lack of sufficient controls at the national level to avoid double 
registration and registration fraud, the lack of consistency between the names on registration 
cards and electoral rolls, and the significant number of voters whose names did not appear on the 
rolls at all (Hampson, 1996b, pp. 88-9). 
The Chapultepec Accords called for the creation of a Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) 
to depoliticize the agency in charge of elections. The TSE, tasked with establishing a new voter 
registration process, failed to consider the country’s demographics and over 60 percent illiteracy, 
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and created a process that was complicated, demanding, and likely established to keep a majority 
of the voters from the polls. The process required immense logistical support including: 
registration forms, copy machines, Polaroid cameras, and laminating machines to create the 
registration cards, as well as vehicles to transport all of this equipment around El Salvador to 
make the process accessible to those living in less populated areas (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 153). 
ONUSAL took on the responsibilities to provide the logistical support for voter registration. For 
example, ONUSAL traveled around El Salvador to locate birth certificates so that individuals 
could register to vote, a task that was supposed to be carried out by the TSE and the different 
mayoral offices (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 153).  ONUSAL was forced to incorporate the work of 
the TSE into its own mission to guarantee a smooth election process with popular participation.  
On election day, ONUSAL deployed 900 observers, 2 per voting site. Observers were 
responsible for carrying voting materials from San Salvador to their destination, counting votes, 
and delivering the official results back to San Salvador (Montgomery, 1995b, p. 247). By the end 
of the election, ONUSAL declared that the elections had been carried out under acceptable 
conditions of liberty, competitiveness and security. Since the March elections did not yield a 
winner for the presidential campaign (with over 50% of votes), a second round was scheduled to 
take place on 24 April. For the second round, ONUSAL dispatched the same number of 
observers to all polls in El Salvador (Montgomery, 1995a, p. 155).  ONUSAL served as an 
election supervisor to prevent any acts of corruption, ballot tampering or results falsification. The 
moral authority that the mission had gained over its time in El Salvador was pivotal in 
guaranteeing the success of the mission’s Electoral Division.  
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ONUSAL faced many difficulties in the area of voter registration because of poor 
infrastructure and lack of government documentation. However, it was able to guarantee that a 
large majority of Salvadorans needing to be registered to vote was registered and that voters 
showing up on Election Day were able to cast their vote freely. There were episodes during 
election day where people were turned away because of faulty documentation or because their 
names were missing from the electoral roster; however, given the circumstances, most observers 
recognize that the 1994 election in El Salvador was free and fair.  
ONUSAL’s Human Rights Division 
ONUSAL’s Human Rights Division had the authority to deploy personnel to any area in 
the country and enter military facilities unannounced. The ability to surprise would-be human 
rights perpetrators served as a deterrent and served to reduce the number of human rights abuses 
in ONUSAL’s presence (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 422). In addition to ONUSAL’s 
monitoring capacity, the mission investigated human rights abuses and prepared periodic reports 
on the human rights situation in El Salvador (Dobbins, et al., 2005, p. 53). To accomplish these 
goals, ONUSAL deployed between four and eight observers to each regional office and had 
human rights officers around the country tasked with addressing human rights violations reports 
(Montgomery, 1995a, p. 148).While ONUSAL’s presence had the short-term effect of 
dissuading would-be violators, the mission’s long term goal was to build national institutions and 
help establish non-governmental organizations to monitor and protect human rights.  
ONUSAL assisted in the creation of the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office, which was 
charged with investigating possible human rights abuses, assisting alleged victims, and 
encouraging prosecution of violators. Furthermore, the Ombudsman was tasked with creating 
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educational programs to promote awareness and respect for human rights (Holiday & Stanley, 
1993, p. 427). ONUSAL assisted the Ombudsman Office to create curricula development and 
implementing various information campaigns to publicize the work of the Office. In addition, 
ONUSAL worked with human rights organizations to create education programs targeting the 
armed forces, the FMLN, and social organizations (Hampson, 1996a, p. 150).  The Ombudsman 
Office was charged with continuing ONUSAL’s work once the mission ended (Holiday & 
Stanley, 1993, p. 427). ONUSAL’s partnership with the Ombudsman Office created a culture of 
human rights respect that could be continued through the work of the Ombudsman once 
ONUSAL left El Salvador. Institutional development was key in this area of the mission’s work, 
because it strived for long term successes beyond its own work.  
ONUSAL helped establish the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (Commission), 
which was responsible for investigating serious acts of violence that had taken place since the 
beginning of the war and that had had a significant impact on Salvadoran society as a whole, as 
well as investigating, documenting and making recommendations to the Salvadoran government 
regarding these abuses (Dobbins, et al., 2005, p. 59).  
Commission on the Truth for El Salvador 
The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (Commission) was created to determine 
the truth about the violence that took place during the war and to make recommendations to help 
El Salvador prevent the repetition of these crimes (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 656). The Commission was 
a direct consequence of the work of the UN and its influence during peace talks (Ensalaco, 1994, 
p. 658). The Chapultepec Peace Accords recognized the need to investigate those acts of 
violence that had impacted Salvadoran society. With this in mind, the Commission investigated 
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serious acts of violence since 1980 and to make legal, political or administrative redress 
(Ensalaco, 1994, p. 658). The goal of the Commission was to end impunity, particularly in cases 
involving the armed forces (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 662). The goal of the Commission was to address 
these crimes so that justice could help bring closure to El Salvador.  
The three members of the Commission appointed by the UN Secretary General were not 
Salvadoran nationals to avoid conflicting interests. Commission members were Belisario 
Betancur, former president of Colombia and president of the Commission; Reinaldo Figueredo, 
former foreign minister of Venezuela; and Thomas Buergenthal, professor of law and honorary 
president of the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights in Costa Rica (Holiday & Stanley, 
1993, p. 431). The members of the commission were chosen because of their impartiality, 
understanding of the region and conflict, and expertise in the area of human rights. Furthermore, 
their affinity with the Spanish language was an important asset that facilitated their work.  
The Commission was specifically tasked with investigating severe acts of violence and 
acts of violence that were part of a systematic pattern of violence. The Commission focused its 
work on 33 out of the 22,000 reported cases, and the Commission steered clear of investigating 
the death squads that had terrorized Salvadoran society during the civil war (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 
660). The Commission’s cases were those that had created national and international outrage like 
the 1981 massacre at El Mozote. International forensic anthropologists conducted an 
investigation in the name of the Commission, exhuming nearly 1,000 bodies and finding that a 
majority of the skeletons were young children (Holiday & Stanley, 1993, p. 432). The work of 
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the Commission was extremely limited and only investigated an extremely small number of 
cases.  
Beyond its investigative work, the Commission also collaborated with other 
organizations created by the accords, including ONUSAL, the National Commission for the 
Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), the National Council for the Protection of Human Rights, the 
Human Rights Ombudsman Office and the Ad Hoc Commission. These agencies were created to 
monitor and implement the transformation of Salvadoran society and national institutions in 
order to create a culture of human rights respect and protection (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 661). The 
establishment of the numerous organizations tasked with addressing human rights in El Salvador 
was proof of the importance placed on human rights during the negotiation process. The 
Commission publicly named individuals who had committed crimes according to international 
human rights and humanitarian law. While the Commission did not have prosecutorial powers, 
its report named individuals and outlined the acts that these individuals had committed and the 
evidence that proved their involvement, which was similar to a judicial proclamation of guilt 
(Ensalaco, 1994, pp. 662-3). While the Commission’s report did not punish those who had 
committed human rights crimes during the war, the work of the Commission brought El Salvador 
closer to ending its culture of impunity. 
The Commission found that the armed forces and paramilitary death squads had 
committed 95 percent of the human rights abuses since 1980, and the FMLN was found 
responsible for the remainder (even if they did not conduct in-depth investigations of the crimes 
committed by the paramilitary death squads) (Montgomery, 1995b, p. 242). The Commission 
31 
 
presented a list of military officers, public officials and judges found to have actively 
participated in the violence and recommended that they be forced to retire, disqualified from 
public office for at least ten years, and disqualified them permanently from holding a position 
related to security. Moreover, the Commission proposed a strict system of discharge for military 
officers found to have violated human rights, and codified the legal penalties with the hopes of 
preventing future abuses of power by the armed forces (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 669). Furthermore, 
the Commission recommended the removal of sitting Supreme Court justices to promote a new 
generation of justices (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 664). The Commission’s recommendations showed the 
need to purge public institutions of human rights violators. The fact that so many military 
officers and members of the justice system had failed to defend human rights was alarming, and 
the Commission and other human rights organizations were determined to prevent such inaction 
from recurring.  
The Commission recommended additional institutional reforms that would be conducive 
to an environment that safeguards human rights. The Commission recommended that suspects be 
guaranteed the right to defense during legal proceedings, that suspects be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty and that the period of maximum detention be shortened (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 
667). Most of the Commission’s recommendations were basic rights protected by democratic 
states that uphold civil and human rights in their constitutions. The Commission recommended 
that lower court judges be accountable to a new National Council of the Judiciary, rather than the 
High Court. Additionally, the Commission recommended that lower courts have greater power 
regarding budgetary matters, that the number of lower court judges and their salaries be 
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increased. All these measures were purposefully designed to prevent corruption within the 
judiciary system (Ensalaco, 1994, p. 668). 
The Commission made important contributions to the cause of justice and the protection 
and promotion of human rights through its investigatory and advisory functions. The report 
created by the Commission served as proof of the human rights violations that had taken place 
during the war. Even though the work of the commission was limited, it proved imperative in 
guiding El Salvador towards a post-war country that recognized the importance of human rights 
and the necessity to establish institutions that are conducive to their respect. The fact that the 
Commission had no prosecutorial power did limit its accomplishments because those found to be 
guilty of human rights violations rarely faced significant punishment for their actions. 
Nevertheless, the work of the Commission was an essential aspect of the reconciliation process 
in El Salvador.  
The Role of Third Parties 
The role of the UN in the peace process and post-war peace building process in El 
Salvador cannot be underestimated. However, it is imperative to recognize that much of its work 
and success was often driven by the role third parties played during the conflict and peace 
negotiations. International events conditioned how third parties reacted and made decisions 
regarding the conflict in El Salvador and how these decisions influenced the peace process and 
the work of the UN in El Salvador. Key players in the Salvadoran peace process included the 
US, the Communist Bloc which included the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua, the Contadora 
Group, and the Friends of the UN Secretary General.   
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The United States 
Historically, the US involvement in El Salvador had been limited. However, this changed 
in the years leading up to the civil war when the US began to play a more significant role in El 
Salvador’s internal politics, especially through the support of the Salvadoran National Security 
Agency, the agency responsible for the dirty war conducted in El Salvador (Byrne, 1996, p. 47). 
As the situation in El Salvador deteriorated leading up to the war, the US fear of a leftist guerrilla 
insurgency taking control of the country led to increased support of the Salvadoran government. 
In 1977, President Jimmy Carter took office with human rights as a pivotal part of his agenda. As 
violence in El Salvador increased in 1980, the Carter administration cut military aid to the 
Salvadoran government (Munck, 1993, p. 77). However, this policy was short lived since 
President Reagan won the 1980 US election and assumed the presidency in 1981, and reversed 
the policy to prevent the spread of communism in the United States’ sphere of influence. The 
Reagan administration characterized the conflict in El Salvador in geopolitical, Cold War terms, 
which allowed the new administration to gain support from the US Congress (Pearce, 1998, p. 
587). 
The Reagan administration provided US$6 billion in economic and military assistance to 
the Salvadoran government during the course of the war (Dobbins, et al., 2005, p. 45). Although 
President Reagan was determined to provide full support for the Salvadoran government, the 
administration faced challenges in the US Congress (Munck, 1993, pp. 77-8). The Reagan 
administration was committed to a military victory in El Salvador (Munck, 1993, p. 75).  Indeed, 
President Reagan’s stance on the conflict in El Salvador perpetuated the violence and the war. 
Even when both parties were willing to negotiate, the Reagan administration strongly opposed a 
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solution to the civil war short of the Salvadoran government’s military victory. By pressuring the 
Salvadoran government and threatening to cut all military and economic aid to the country, the 
Reagan administration kept the Salvadoran government away from the negotiating table.  
The election of President George H.W. Bush was key in moving both parties towards the 
negotiation table. The Bush administration proved to be more open to a negotiated solution 
(Munck, 1993, p. 75). The turning point in US policy towards El Salvador was the murder of the 
Jesuit priests by members of the US-trained Atlacatl Brigade of the army (Karl, 1992, p. 154). 
The images caused outrage in the US and forced the Bush administration to actively promote a 
negotiated solution. Once the Bush administration expressed its approval for a negotiated peace, 
both parties willingly took part in peace talks. In conclusion, the US military and economic 
support for the Salvadoran government was pivotal in preventing a military victory by the FMLN 
and the military stagnation of the conflict until the Bush administration finally agreed to a 
negotiated solution.  
The Communist Bloc 
The FMLN received varying levels of military support from the communist bloc, which 
included the Soviet Union, Sandinista Nicaragua, and Cuba. However, as the Cold War began to 
wind down, and the Sandinistas were ousted in national elections in Nicaragua, the number of 
FMLN external supporters became extremely limited (Hampson, 1996a, pp. 135-6). In 1988, the 
USSR officially withdrew its support for revolutionary movements in Central America (Karl, 
1992, p. 151).  It is important to note that despite proof that the FMLN received limited support 
from the Soviet Union, political relations between the Soviets and the FMLN were extremely 
limited during civil war. There is a clear difference between the support the FMLN received 
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from the Soviet Union and other communist countries in the region and the support received by 
the Salvadoran government from the United States. The FMLN refused to be influence by 
outside parties and, therefore, limited the aid it received from the communist bloc in order to 
maintain its autonomy and freedom from outside influenced (Hampson, 1996a, p. 136). Thus, the 
charges that the FMLN was a tool of extra-hemispheric interests, especially Soviet, would prove 
to be false.  
The Contadora Group 
The Contadora Group was organized by Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama in 
January 1983 as a reaction to the overwhelming influence and involvement of the US in the 
region. Contadora proclaimed that it would work to find a diplomatic alternative to the armed 
conflicts plaguing the Central American region (Lee, 2010, p. 272). Contadora produced 
proposals that encouraged demilitarization, the end of foreign intervention in the region and the 
importance of dialogue and diplomacy to resolve the conflicts in the region. These proposals 
included the Cancun Declaration of 1983 and the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in 
Central America of 1984. These proposals encouraged national governments to address some of 
the problems facing the region and set the peace processes in Central American in motion; 
however, they failed to directly establish peace in El Salvador (Lee, 2010, p. 272). The 
Contadora Group approach was quite ambitious in that it attempted to tackle the region as a 
whole. However, the conflicts in the region were too complex to be addressed collectively and 
needed individualized negotiations with the different insurgent forces. Furthermore, Contadora 
attempted to exclude the US from the peace process, which was unrealistic when considering the 
monetary and military support that the US gave to different groups in the region to promote its 
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interests (Whitfield, 1999, pp. 260-1).  Contadora’s attempt to find a regional solution to a 
national problem failed to produce tangible results in El Salvador, and despite the group’s efforts 
to push the FMLN and the Salvadoran government towards the negotiating table, it failed to do 
so. However, Contadora’s work did create an environment in the region where peace 
negotiations were encouraged as stepping stone that facilitated eventual peace processes.   
The Friends of the UN Secretary General 
Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Spain comprised the Friends of the UN Secretary 
General (the Friends), which was created in 1989 at the request of Secretary General Pérez de 
Cuéllar. The Friends worked as lobbyists in the peace process, helping promote the goals of the 
UN with both the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. Also, the Friends used the cultural, 
linguistic and political affinities to encourage both parties to remain at the negotiating table. 
Furthermore, the Friends provided logistical support for the negotiators including transportation, 
accommodation and security to guarantee that both parties attended the meetings. It is important 
to note that the Friends did not act independently; rather, they worked as an extension of the 
Secretary General’s group of negotiators and mediators (Lee, 2010, p. 273). The Friends 
provided important support to Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar and the UN team during the 
21-month peace process; however, most of the accomplishments during the peace process can be 
attributed to the Secretary General’s direct team of advisors rather than the Friends.  
Post ONUSAL El Salvador 
ONUSAL was a pivotal player in the peace building process in El Salvador, a product of 
the work of the UN at the negotiating table, ONUSAL tackled post-war El Salvador by working 
in different areas that included the work of its political division, electoral division, military 
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division and human rights division. These different areas of work in El Salvador yielded 
different levels of success that translated into decisive issues that have been shaping El 
Salvador’s future since the end of ONUSAL’s work in 1995. ONUSAL has been deemed 
successful in its work and is often cited as the example of a successful peace building mission 
where the UN has taken the lead not only in negotiating peace but also in peace building. In the 
case of El Salvador, the roots of the civil war lay in the political and economic structures that led 
to a system that perpetuated inequality by favoring the ruling elite. The work of ONUSAL 
addressed the institutional failures of El Salvador and sought to create a more inclusive political 
system that limited the power of the military and opened the playing field to opposition parties. 
However, ONUSAL did not take part in the economic restructuring of the country, which was 
one of the major problems that led to the creation of the FMLN.   
The work of ONUSAL’s Electoral Division facilitated the transition to peace and allowed 
for democratic processes to take place with the presence of opposition groups in the electoral 
contest without fear of prosecution. The FMLN transitioned from a guerrilla group into a 
political party and became an active player in post-war Salvadoran politics. There is an evident 
commitment from opposition groups and the government to reach peaceful solutions to the 
problems facing El Salvador today, a result of the peace building process that helped create 
democratic institutions that opened the political process to opposition parties. The 1994 elections 
that were supervised by ONUSAL were deemed free and fair by the international community. In 
addition, the legislative elections of 1997 and presidential election of 1999 were also accepted as 
free and fair and recognized as legitimate by local parties (Paris, 2002, p. 51).  
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Since the end of the civil war, El Salvador has held four free and fair presidential 
elections (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009) and six free and fair legislative elections (1994, 1997, 
2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009). The country has been able to maintain a stable democracy since the 
signing of the peace agreement. According to data from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 
Survey, which measures both political rights and civil liberties in countries around the world on a 
scale of 1-7 (1 being the highest degree of freedom and 7 being the lowest), El Salvador’s post-
civil war levels of political rights and civil liberties have returned to pre-war levels. El Salvador 
saw a decline in political rights in the years leading up to and during the war and witnessed 
significant improvement in the last years of the war and years following the war. By 1996, El 
Salvador finally reached its best political rights rating since 1975, being granted a score of 2, 
which it has maintained ever since, as seen in Figure 1. The trend has been similar in civil 
liberties, with a significant decline in civil liberties in the years leading up to the civil war and 
during the war and witnessing an improvement in 1991 when it finally reached its pre-war 1976 




Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Survey 1972-2011 
Figure 1: Political Rights in El Salvador 
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As seen in both Figure 1 and Figure 2, political rights and civil liberties did return to pre-
civil war values; however, they did not improve beyond that. According to Freedom House, 
these pre and post-civil war values deem El Salvador as “free” both in political rights and civil 
liberties, while the values seen during the civil war were deemed “partially free.” The data in 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that the peace process helped return the political process to its pre-
civil war years; however, it does not show improvement from the values prior to 1975, the period 
which led up to the increased violence and the eruption of the civil war. Therefore, the above 
data can be interpreted as showing that the peace process helped in the transition from civil war 
to peace and from limited political rights and civil liberties to increased political rights and civil 
liberties. With this in mind, this data shows that the work of ONUSAL’s Electoral Division 
accomplished its goal of guaranteeing free and fair democratic processes in El Salvador and that 
ONUSAL’s Military Division’s work in demilitarizing and reforming the army led to an increase 
in civil liberties since the end of the war.  
The cost and impact that twelve years of civil war have on a country’s economy are 
difficult to estimate. In the case of El Salvador, the country’s economic situation prior to the start 
of the civil war was already dire, with rampant poverty and vast inequality, both of which 
contributed to the rise of the insurgency and a civil war driven by class-struggle. The damage to 
the Salvadoran infrastructure has been estimated at more than US$ 1 billion in addition to the 
human costs of 75,000 casualties, 20,000 wounded veterans, 1,000 orphaned children and one 
million internally displaced (Munck, 1993, p. 87). The Chapultepec Accords failed to recognize 
the importance of the country’s economic situation in the peace and reconstruction process and 
the accords failed to outline an economic plan that would result in a more inclusive economic 
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system. Therefore, ONUSAL did not include an Economic Division to address the causal issues 
of the civil war (Toft, 2010, p. 90).  As a result, ONUSAL was left out of the economic recovery 
plan in El Salvador, economic and structural reforms were left at the hands of the Salvadoran 
government and other international organizations including the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  
The economic plans for the World Bank and IMF were to deliver economic adjustment, 
stabilization and economic growth to El Salvador. The structural adjustments encouraged by 
financial international organizations resulted in a significant cut in social spending and public 
investment, which scholars attribute to some of the difficulties faced in other areas of the peace 
process that suffered because of a lack of resources (Pearce, 1998, p. 601). The economic 
liberalization implemented by these organizations hindered the recovery process and exacerbated 
some of the socioeconomic issues that had led to the civil war in the first place (Paris, 2002, p. 
51). The economic recovery process was extremely slow, which many feared would result in a 
return to violence in El Salvador. The gross national income (GNI) per capita had reached its 
highest point in pre-civil war El Salvador in 1978 with a GNI per capita in 2000 constant US 
dollars of $2,238.77 as seen in Figure 3. We also find in Figure 3 that pre-war GNI levels were 
finally equaled and surpassed in 2003 when the GNI per capita in 2000 constant US dollars 
reached $2,303.58, eleven years after the signing of the Chapultepec Accords. Evidently, there 
has been recovery since the end of the civil war in economic terms. However, this recovery has 
been extremely slow and many argue that much of the growth has benefited a small section of 
the Salvadoran society, mirroring the economic structure that predated the civil war. The Human 
Development Index, developed by the UN Development Programs, which measures a long 
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healthy life, access to education and a decent standard of living, has been on the rise in El 
Salvador. The first HDI measurement in El Salvador dates back to 1980 and was 0.466 as seen in 
Figure 4. Also, Figure 4 shows that El Salvador’s HDI was 0.524 in 1990 and that even during 
the war years the country’s HDI had continued to improve and by 2000 was 0.61 and has 
continued to steadily increase. The HDI is supposed to measure the population’s standard of 
living, which, according to this data, has continued to improve in El Salvador in post-war years. 
Although the recovery in El Salvador has been slow, the data shows that there indeed have been 
signs of economic growth and development. However, the country continues to face economic 
inequality and a lack of social mobility as it did prior to the civil war, which scholars argue has 
resulted in the alarming levels of violence that exist in El Salvador today.  
 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
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Source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), International Human Development Indicators. 
Figure 4: Human Development Index in El Salvador 
 
ONUSAL’s military division was tasked with disarming the FMLN and the 
reincorporation of former combatants to civil society. The process was hindered by a lack of 
resources and a lack of cooperation by the Salvadoran government but by the end of 1992 the 
guerrilla groups were officially disbanded. However, the disarming process was done with little 
verification, with ONUSAL lacking the means to control whether the FMLN had completely 
disarmed. Furthermore, land transfers that were supposed to help in the reintegration process of 
FMLN combatants were extremely slow and only about 40 percent of these were actually 
completed. All of these factors have contributed to the violence that has plagued El Salvador in 
post-war years. This violence has often been attributed to former guerrilla fighters who were 
unable to find employment, did not receive pensions from the Salvadoran government, and had 
















from the government (Paris, 2002, pp. 52-3).  Many of these combatants have turned to 
organized criminal activity that has given way to the rise of the Salvadoran “maras” or gangs, 
which are responsible for much of the insecurity that faces El Salvador (Ozerdem, 2009, p. 55).  
Another alarming development in El Salvador is the role the army has continued to play in 
dealing with the violence. Driven by the desperation of Salvadorans for more security, the 
government has relied on the army’s assistance to help curb the maras. According to the 
Chapultepec Accords, the army’s role is limited to national security and it should have no role in 
the country’s domestic security issues. However, this has not been the case when dealing with 
the upsurge of criminal violence. The PNC was created to deal with internal security issues; 
however, the PNC’s development has been slow and the alarming levels of violence have pushed 
the Salvadoran government to reach for further assistance, resulting in a more active role the 
armed forces in El Salvador’s internal security affairs.  
Conclusion 
The role of the UN in bringing peace to El Salvador and helping in the post-conflict 
process was extremely important. The UN was a driving force in the negotiation process thanks 
to the dedication of Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar and his advisors. The UN arranged for 
the meetings and played an active role in making sure that the process ran smoothly, when 
specific issues threatened the talks, UN advisors negotiated with both parties to ensure an 
agreement. It is important to recognize that moving towards a negotiated solution to the war in El 
Salvador was also influenced by world events and changes in major powers’ attitudes. The end 
of the Cold War removed the conflict from the traditional East vs. West perspective. Furthermore, 
the change in administration in the US from President Reagan to President Bush was decisive in 
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the move towards negotiations. Following the peace accords, ONUSAL was charged not only 
with the traditional peacekeeping task of supervising the cease-fire, but also with helping in the 
peace building process which included work through the specialized missions of Military, 
Electoral, Police and Human Rights Divisions. All of these tasks were beyond the scope of 
traditional peacekeeping missions and it was the first time a UN mission took on such extended 
responsibilities in a post conflict environment. Both ONUSAL’s Military and Police Divisions 
yielded relative successes in assisting in the demilitarization of the FMLN, the armed forces 
reform and the establishment of a civilian police force. However, the lack of economic 
opportunities for former FMLN combatants has caused the violence witnessed during the civil 
war to resurface via different channels, including organized criminal activity and maras. 
ONUSAL’s electoral division was pivotal in El Salvador’s return to democratic rule and the 
country has since returned to its democratic status. Elections that have taken place since the end 
of the war have been deemed free and fair by various international organizations and the political 
process has become more open and fair allowing for the participation of opposition parties. In the 
area of human rights, ONUSAL played a fundamental role in promoting reconciliation in post-
war El Salvador and in uncovering the crimes committed during the civil war years. El Salvador 
developed greater respect for human rights and the necessary institutions remain in place to 
guarantee the protection of human rights. In addition, civil liberties have been deemed free and 
have returned to pre-war standards, a step in the right direction for human rights in El Salvador.  
In conclusion, the work of ONUSAL has yielded important successes in post-war El 
Salvador, with important long lasting accomplishments by the missions of the Military, Police, 
Electoral and Human Rights Divisions. Many of the challenges faced by El Salvador today are 
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linked to the lack of economic restructuring following the end of the war that would allow for a 
more inclusive and equitable system that could facilitate social mobility. However, it is 
important to note that economic restructuring was not at the hands of ONUSAL. Instead it was 
managed by the Salvadoran government, the IMF and the World Bank. There was a failure in the 
lack of coordination between these international financial institutions and ONUSAL’s work, 
which in retrospect could have helped prevent economic restructuring that hindered the peace 
building process. Furthermore, it is essential to note that despite little experience in peace 
building and nation building, the UN’s role in the case of El Salvador is characterized as an 
important success in post-conflict environments. Thus, ONUSAL’s work is deemed to have 




CHAPTER 3 – UNITED NATIONS VERIFICATION MISSION IN 
GUATEMALA (MINUGUA) 
Historical Background 
Guatemala’s civil war lasted thirty-six years with varying levels of intensity and was the 
deadliest in the Central American region, claiming the lives of up to 200,000 civilians (Jonas, 
1996, p. 146). The Guatemalan socioeconomic system created deep divides that led to 
institutionalized inequality and discrimination. As described by Guatemala’s Commission for 
Historical Clarification, the country’s declaration of independence created “an authoritarian state 
which excluded the majority of the population, was racist…, and served to protect the economic 
interests of the privileged minority” (Commission for Historical Clarification, 1999).  
Historically, the dominant land-owning class controlled the country’s agricultural sectors. This 
economic system was further reinforced in the early 1900 with coffee growing estates, when the 
cash crop represented 85 percent of Guatemala’s exports. The increase in coffee production led 
to the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a limited group and forced the country’s 
peasants from subsistence farming to wage-labor. The landowning elite also dominated national 
politics through a series of authoritarian regimes backed by the armed forces (Paris, 2002, p. 55). 
The state protected the interests of this small but powerful minority by excluding the majority of 
the population. Guatemala’s political and economic systems of inequality were crucial factors 
that contributed to the start of the civil war (Commission for Historical Clarification, 1999).  
While the causes of the war were rooted in Guatemala’s institutionalized inequality, the 
failed attempt at land reform by the administration of Jacobo Arbenz followed by the coup 
backed by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also helped trigger the civil war. The 1944 
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Guatemalan election brought Arbenz to power with an ambitious reform agenda, including the 
creation of farming cooperatives, social security, rural education, a labor code, and the 
confiscation and redistribution of farmland to 100,000 landless peasants (Paris, 2002, p. 56). In 
1950, the Arbenz administration introduced the Agrarian Reform Law, which mandated the 
redistribution of unused lands in excess of 223 acres, compensating landowners for the 
expropriated land in the form of 25 year bonds with 3 percent interest paid at the declared tax 
value of the land (Trefzger, 2001, p. 81). The debate over this redistributive law led to violence 
between the landowning elite and local peasants. Among those opposing the Agrarian Reform 
Law was US-based United Fruit Company (UFCO) (Paris, 2002, p. 56). UFCO was Guatemala’s 
largest single landowner and the company had undervalued its land in tax declarations, making 
the government’s compensation lower than what the company expected. As a result, UFCO 
requested the US government to intervene. The State Department and Central Intelligence 
Agency recruited a proxy army to forcefully remove Arbenz from power. The proxy army, 
however, was no match for the Guatemalan army, leading to the initiation of a psychological war 
on Arbenz (Trefzger, 2001, p. 82).  The Arbenz government was finally overthrown and replaced 
by a succession of civilian and military right-wing governments. These governments forcefully 
took action against the rural based insurgencies that had been gaining varying levels of support 
from urban dissidents and rural supporters (Paris, 2002, p. 56). In the years following the CIA-
backed coup, the alliance between Guatemala’s military, the nation’s economic elite, and the US 
strengthened, allowing the authoritarian state to suppress popular demands for social and 
economic change (Ruhl, 2005, p. 56).  
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The civil war officially began in 1960 and by 1961 the Movimiento Rebelde 13 de 
Noviembre (MR-13) was formed. MR-13 lacked any ideological backing but by 1962, it had 
joined forces with the Guatemalan Communist Party, resulting in the creation of the Fuerzas 
Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) (Trefzger, 2001, p. 86). The first phase of the war was limited to the 
country’s eastern region (Jonas, 2000a, p. 11). In 1966, the FAR intensified its insurgency 
operations, triggering a strong response by the Guatemalan army and leading to the army’s first 
counterinsurgency campaign. The army launched a preemptive attack on the guerrillas, targeting 
anyone suspected of supporting the insurgency (Trefzger, 2001, p. 89). The military offensive 
between 1966 and 1970 resulted in the death of 8,000 people, most of them civilian peasants 
(Sieder, 2001, p. 187).The devastating military counteroffensive forced the guerrilla group to 
retreat and remain dormant for the next 2 years (Jonas, 2000a, p. 11). 
The second phase of the war took place in Guatemala’s highland region where the 
insurgency had the indigenous communities’ support. The army carried out a brutal campaign 
that resulted in the death of 100,000 to 150,000 between 1981 and 1983. The army launched 
attacks against the indigenous community, committing a wide range of human rights violations, 
including direct and deliberate violence against women and children and the systematic use of 
torture, rape, and forced displacement as a weapon of war (Commission for Historical 
Clarification, 1999). In addition, the army created forced installation camps and mandatory 
army-controlled paramilitary “civilian self-defense patrols” (PACs) (Jonas, 1996, p. 148). To 
counter the army’s offensive, the FAR joined forces with two other insurgency groups: the 
Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) and the Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en 
Armas (ORPA), establishing the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) in 
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1982 (Montobio, 1997, p. 100). By the late 1980s, the URNG was no match for the Guatemalan 
armed forces, which was motivated to strive for a military victory (Burgerman, 2000, p. 74). 
However, by 1990 domestic and international pressure for a negotiated solution had built up, 
forcing the army and the government to negotiate with the URNG.  
The UN and Peace Negotiations 
In 1989, the Catholic Church held a National Dialogue, which the army, government, and 
private sector boycotted.  The Dialogue, beyond the official meetings, allowed for the open 
discussion of issues that had been banned from the public sphere since the beginning of the war. 
The outcome of the dialogue demonstrated a public consensus on a negotiated settlement (Jonas, 
1996, p. 150). In January 1991, President Jorge Serrano assumed the presidency and called for a 
meeting with the URNG, which resulted in the first accord between the two parties and divided 
the peace process into two stages. The first stage included a series of meetings between the 
URNG, the government, and civil society and the second stage included the official dialogue 
between the URNG and the government (Montobio, 1997, p. 102). The United Nations (UN) 
played the role of observer during the negotiations at the request of both parties (Burgerman, 
2000, p. 75).  
In April 1991, both parties met in Mexico City and signed the “Agreement on Procedures 
in Search of Peace through Political Means,” which established the basic agenda for the 
negotiations. The agreement outlined the issues to be discussed during the negotiations, 
including: democratization, human rights, the role of the army, indigenous rights, socio-
economic and agrarian reform, resettlement of internally displaced populations, constitutional 
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reform, a cease-fire, and the reincorporation of URNG combatants into civil society (Arnson, 
1997, p. 259). In July 1991, both parties met in Mexico City and produced the Queretaro Accord, 
which further detailed the negotiations schedule (Montobio, 1997, p. 102). Following the 
Queretaro Accord, there was little progress made until 1994. One of the principal reasons why 
the peace process stagnated was President Serrano’s auto-coup in May 1993, when he attempted 
to dissolve Guatemala’s legislature and Supreme Court and suspend constitutional rights. 
Serrano’s failed attempt to increase the presidential powers led to his resignation (Arnson, 1997, 
p. 260). Serrano’s auto coup kept the URNG away from the negotiating table for the remainder 
of 1993, further complicating an already difficult peace process.  
Peace talks resumed in January 1994. The URNG and the government met in Mexico 
City and signed a new agreement, which maintained the schedule outlined in the 1991 Mexico 
Accords. Furthermore, both parties agreed to extend the role of the UN to mediator with the 
capacity of proposing measures and initiatives during the negotiations (Montobio, 1997, p. 106). 
The January 1994 “Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process” 
established the general agenda and called for civil society to play a crucial role in the peace 
process by establishing the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC) (Spector B. I., 2011, p. 36). The 
ASC was comprised of all organized sectors of civil society and major political parties and was 
tasked with providing non-binding proposals to be considered by the parties during the 
negotiations (Jonas, 2000a, p. 13). The following meeting between the URNG and the 
government was in March 1994, where both parties signed an accord on human rights and 
requested the UN Secretary General to establish a human rights verification mission (Burgerman, 
2000, p. 76). The “Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights” outlined the parties’ 
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commitment to strengthening human rights institutions and to end impunity (Spector B. I., 2011, 
p. 36).  
In June 1994, the parties signed two new accords. The first established the relocation 
process for internally displaced persons and the second established a Truth Commission to 
investigate the human rights crimes that had taken place during the war (Montobio, 1997, p. 106). 
The Commission was a watered-down version compared to other truth commissions in the region, 
tasked with uncovering the most significant cases of human rights violations but abstaining from 
naming individuals responsible for these violations (Jonas, 2000a, p. 13). The Guatemalan 
government was particularly criticized because during this time human rights violations 
worsened, raising questions about the government’s true commitment to the peace process 
(Jonas, 1996, p. 152). 
The next accord in the peace process was signed in March 1995 addressing the “Identity 
and Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (Jonas, 2000a, p. 13). This accord was extremely important 
considering the violence targeting the Mayan community during the war. In May 1996, the 
URNG and the government agreed on the accord addressing socio-economic and agrarian issues. 
The agreement on these issues was made in coordination with the IMF, the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank, which pushed for liberalization and macroeconomic stability 
but also demanded that the Guatemalan government provide social safety nets to protect the most 
vulnerable sectors of the population (Paris, 2002, p. 57). The socio-economic accord called for 
an important increase in taxes as well as government spending on health, education, and housing 
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(Arnson, 1997, p. 261). The socio-economic accord attempted to tackle the institutionalized 
inequality that led to the civil war in the first place. 
In September 1996, the parties signed the “Accord on Strengthening of Civilian Power 
and Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society,” addressing the demilitarization process 
and mandating constitutional reforms limiting the role of the armed forces. The armed forces 
were subordinated to civilian control and their role limited to national security. Furthermore, the 
accord established a new civilian police force to address domestic security issues (Jonas, 2000a, 
p. 14). The final accords were signed in Guatemala’s National Palace on 29 December 1996. The 
accords addressed fundamental issues for establishing long lasting peace, calling for: the 
disbanding of rural forces under military control; the creation of a new national civilian police 
force under the supervision of the Public Ministry; increasing the number of police officers to 
guarantee domestic security; arm control laws; and the creation of a system for the 
administration of justice (Kincaid, 2000, p. 48). The peace accords marked the beginning of the 
post-war process that would bring democracy to Guatemala and begin the reconciliation process.  
The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) 
The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) was established by 
the General Assembly’s resolution 48/267 in September 1994 following the Security Council’s 
failure to establish the mission (Res 48/27). MINUGUA was the first international presence in 
Guatemala in decades, a reflection of the international community’s interest in the Guatemalan 
peace process (Jonas, 2000b, p. 48). However, it is important to note that even if the mission was 
openly supported by the international community, the UN still faced many difficulties in carrying 
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out its mission in Guatemala. The UN faced political and financial attacks during the 
Guatemalan peace process, particularly from the United States (US), which severely hindered the 
resources allocated to MINUGUA (Jonas, 2000b, p. 58). Originally, MINUGUA was scheduled 
to end in 2000 but it received several extensions, allowing the mission to remain in Guatemala 
through 2004 to assist with that year’s elections. MINUGUA’s work spanned through four 
civilian administrations and was present through three national elections and the implementation 
of the peace accords (Report of the Secretary General A/59/746). 
Originally, MINUGUA was established to carry out human rights verification beginning 
in November 1994, two years before the final peace accords were signed. The mission faced 
many difficulties starting with the lack of Security Council support and a delayed deployment 
because of difficulties within the UN system. Following the signing of the peace accords, the 
Security Council approved an extension to the original MINUGUA mandate, allowing for a 
military unit to be annexed to the mission to assist with demilitarization. MINUGUA’s mission 
was divided into four primary tasks, including: verification both in human rights and 
demilitarization; technical assistance and advisory services; the Secretary General’s good offices; 
and public information (Whitfield, 1999, p. 284). 
MINUGUA faced overt attacks on its offices and harassment and threats against its 
personnel (Jonas, 2000b, p. 49). The mission operated in a hostile environment because there 
were sectors of Guatemalan society which opposed its presence. In addition, the Guatemalan 
government engaged in a campaign to undermine the work of MINUGUA, attempting to limit 
the mission’s work. Furthermore, the armed forces expressed important resistance to 
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MINUGUA’s presence, launching a campaign against the mission hoping to undermine its 
effectiveness and credibility (Jonas, 2000b, p. 50). MINUGUA’s work was extremely 
challenging because of the lack of support from the government and the armed forces.  
MINUGUA’s Verification Division 
MINUGUA’s Verification Division’s original mandate was human rights verification but 
was later extended to include the verification and supervision of all aspects of the peace accords, 
including the demobilization of URNG combatants, weapons confiscation, and assisting in the 
creation of the new civilian police force (Paris, 2002, p. 57). MINUGUA’s human rights 
verification work began amid a polarized political environment that complicated the mission’s 
work in verifying the parties’ compliance with the “Comprehensive Agreement on Human 
Rights” (Report of the Secretary General A/59/746). Parallel to its verification work, MINUGUA 
created human rights reports on the human rights situation in Guatemala. These reports show the 
challenges that the mission faced because of the deeply rooted culture of impunity (Jonas, 2000b, 
p. 48). While the presence of MINUGUA was not enough to prevent human rights violations, it 
helped to slowly mitigate the number of human rights abuses. The mission’s human rights 
verification was systematic, receiving and investigating human rights complaints through its 
nationwide network. MINUGUA’s work in human rights verification was the mission’s signature 
activity and helped uncover human rights violations that took place in post civil war Guatemala.  
Following the final peace accords, the Security Council adopted resolution 1094 on 20 
January 1997 authorizing the addition of a 155 military observer group for a three month period 
starting on 3 March 1997. MINUGUA’s mandate was extended to include the verification of the 
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ceasefire agreement (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations). Of the 155 authorized personnel, 
132 were military observers from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, Norway, the 
Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the US, Uruguay, and Venezuela and 13 were 
medical personnel from Austria, Germany, and Singapore (Report of the Secretary General 
S/1997/432). The new Security Council supported mission was stronger than its predecessor. The 
military observer group was tasked with assisting the Guatemalan government with the URNG 
demobilization scheduled to begin following the final peace accords.  
URNG combatants were concentrated in eight assembly points around the country to 
begin the demobilization process. MINUGUA established secure routes for combatants to reach 
the concentration points without risks. To guarantee the security of combatants in the respective 
concentration points, MINGUA military observers established eight teams of 15 observers along 
with another 32 observers who were distributed throughout the eight concentration points for 
command and control. UN military personnel administered and supervised the concentration 
points where combatants were held (Report of the Secretary General S/1996/1045). The 
Guatemalan army was not allowed to enter the 6 kilometer area surrounding the assembly points 
to protect URNG combatants and encourage full demobilization. URNG combatants were issued 
provisional identification cards to facilitate their reintegration into civil life. MINUGUA was 
tasked with creating and issuing the identification cards for 2,928 URNG members concentrated 
in the assembly points. Furthermore, MINUGUA created identification cards for an additional 
1,258 URNG members who under the provisions of the agreement were not required to be 
concentrated (Report of the Secretary General S/1997/432).  
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As combatants reached the assembly points, they registered and surrendered their 
weapons to UN military observers who kept a detailed inventory of the number of weapons, 
explosives, and mines surrendered. The weapons were securely stored under MINUGUA’s 
supervision and were later transferred to Guatemalan authorities following the completion of the 
demobilization process. As a whole, 535,102 weapons and rounds of ammunition were 
surrendered to MINGUA during the demobilization process (McNeish & Lopez Rivera, 2012, p. 
297). In addition to the surrendering of their weapons, URNG combatants provided the location 
of landmines placed during the war. MINUGUA helped to identify and clear these landmines 
with the assistance of the Guatemalan government. Upon the completion, 378 mines and 
explosive devices were removed and destroyed (Report of the Secretary General S/1997/432). 
MINUGUA’s personnel did not have the capacity to singlehandedly remove the landmines; 
however, with the cooperation of the URNG and the Guatemalan government the mission was 
able to carry out the additional task and successfully demine the areas outlined by the URNG. 
MINUGUA’S work in the demobilization of URNG combatants was pivotal in 
guaranteeing the security of URNG members. The process was successful in providing a 
transition phase for URNG combatants from the battlefield to civil life. Furthermore, the 
demobilization process succeeded in collecting an important number of illegal arms that were in 
possession of URNG members as well as in demining areas that would have otherwise remained 
a threat to Guatemala’s civilian population. After MINUGUA’s human rights work, the 
mission’s demobilization process was the most successful aspect of the mission.  
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MINUGUA’s Good Offices Division 
The work of MINGUA’s good offices was somewhat limited in comparison to the 
mission’s verification division. The good offices served as mediator in national debates. One of 
the good offices first accomplishments was helping the URNG and government work out their 
differences pertaining to the implementation of the peace accords (Report of the Secretary 
General A/59/746). The role of the good offices in this matter was similar to the role the UN 
played during the peace negotiations, serving as mediator and guarantor. The good offices 
worked in the interest of the peace accords and coordinated and worked with both parties to 
prevent disagreements that could have hindered the implementation process. In addition to its 
role as mediator between the URNG and the government, MINUGUA’s good offices served a 
similar role in disputes between the indigenous Mayan communities and the public sector 
(Krujit, 2000, p. 26).  In this role, MINUGUA promoted national dialogue between social forces 
by establishing community level negotiations to prevent violent confrontations between the 
parties involved (Burgerman, 2000, p. 78). In addition, MINUGUA’s good offices assisted in the 
negotiation process between the government and human rights organizations that resulted in the 
2003 agreement on the design of a national reparations program for victims of human rights 
violations (Report of the Secretary General A/59/746).The hostile environment in Guatemala 
following the civil war made the presence of MINUGUA’s good offices indispensable for 
national dialogue.  
MINUGUA’s Technical Assistance Division 
MINUGUA’s technical assistance division provided technical assistance in different 
sectors pertaining to the implementation of the peace accords. Through the use of formal and 
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informal assistance at different levels from government to civil society, the division provided 
expertise in different areas to facilitate the peace process. In addition, the division provided funds 
to facilitate the implementation of programs and initiatives that helped the peace process. 
MINUGUA was comprised of experts in the areas of indigenous affairs, macroeconomic and 
fiscal policy, labor issues, land rights and agrarian policy, military and public security, and 
gender issues, among others (Report of the Secretary General A/59/746).  The technical 
assistance division served as an advisory board that assisted the government and civil society in 
implementing the peace accords. The diversity of the division’s expertise was a reflection of the 
intricate peace accords that encompassed a diverse number of issues.  
MINUGUA’s Public Information Division 
MINUGUA’s public information division helped raise awareness about the peace process 
and the peace accords and how these benefited Guatemalan society. The public information 
division educated the public on the post-civil war environment and raised awareness about 
human rights and civil rights. To carry out its work, MINUGUA held informative talks and 
workshops in communities around the country. To bridge the cultural gaps and to incorporate the 
Mayan community into the public debate, MINUGUA translated the peace accords into the most 
commonly spoken indigenous languages (Report of the Secretary General A/59/746). 
MINUGUA’s public information division’s goals were to enhance public education and establish 
alternative channels of communication by strengthening the role of NGOs and increase the 
participation of indigenous communities (Burgerman, 2000, p. 78). In a country characterized by 
deeply rooted cleavages that marginalized large sectors of the population from political and 
economic life, using public information to bridge these cleavages was an enormous task. The 
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lack of support from the Guatemalan government made the work of the public information 
division more challenging; however, its work succeeded in reaching some of Guatemala’s most 
marginalized populations.  
MINUGUA’s role in post conflict Guatemala facilitated the peace process and helped 
implement the peace accords. Particularly important was the role of the mission’s verification 
division and its work in human rights verification and URNG demobilization. In the area of 
human rights, the presence of the mission contributed to a reduction in human rights violatiosn in 
the last years of the conflict and following the signing of the peace accords. However, the hostile 
environment in which the mission worked limited its accomplishments. In the area of 
demobilization, the work of MINUGUA facilitated the process and guaranteed that the 
demobilization of the URNG took place in a secure and peaceful environment, a guarantee that 
would have otherwise been impossible without the presence of a neutral force. The disarmament 
process was also significant in removing unregistered and illegal weapons from the public 
sphere. Furthermore, the demining process was an important step to protect civilians from the 
long lasting threat. 
The mission’s good offices, technical assistance and public information divisions’ work 
was important in facilitating the peace process. However, it is important to note that the 
accomplishments of these divisions were limited in comparison to the verification division. The 
work of these three divisions was somewhat superficial, because their work was limited to their 
advisory role rather than a hands-on, proactive, and involved role as was the case of the 
verification division. The limited role of these three divisions is a reflection of the international 
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community’s changing attitudes towards UN involvements. UN mission fatigue was evident 
when MINUGUA was created and, therefore, the mission’s work was limited. In addition, the 
lack of support from the government and the armed forces made further involvement by 
MINUGUA difficult. In all, the mission accomplished its goals, however limited these might 
have been.  
Commission for Historical Clarification 
The Guatemalan government and the URNG created the Commission for Historical 
Clarification (CEH) to uncover the causes of the war and the atrocities that took place during the 
conflict. The CEH was supported domestically by civil society, the private sector, and media 
organizations and internationally by the UN, the European Union, the international media and 
international NGOs (Eckhardt, 2006, p. 30). The CEH’s goal was to clarify the human rights 
violations and violent acts that were committed during the war (Tomuschat, 2001, p. 233). The 
CEH investigated human rights violations to bring closure to three decades of violence. 
However, the CEH was prohibited from assigning individual responsibilities to the parties 
involved in the violations (Tomuschat, 2001, p. 243). This led to criticism from the international 
community, which saw the CEH’s inability to assign guilt as a continuation of Guatemala’s 
culture of impunity.  
The CEH investigated human rights violations connected to the armed conflict, drafted a 
report containing the results of the CEH’s investigation, offered an objective assessment of what 
had occurred during the conflict, and formulated recommendations to help cultivate a culture of 
human rights respect (Crandall, 2004, p. 5). The CEH was composed of Christian Tomuschat, a 
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German academic, Otilia Lux de Coti, a Guatemalan indigenous pedagogue, and Alfredo 
Balsells, a Guatemalan lawyer (Crandall, 2004, p. 4). The CEH’s work began in April 1997. 
However, the first three months the CEH’s work focused on raising the funds necessary to carry 
out its mandate efficiently. The CEH’s actual investigative work began in September 1997 after 
staff members had completed an introductory course training them to carry out the investigative 
tasks necessary. The investigative phase of the mission concluded in April 1998. At this time, the 
commission focused exclusively on producing its final report (Tomuschat, 2001, p. 242).  
The CEH’s report titled “Guatemala: Memory of Silence” was a 12-volume report 
released in February 1999 (Holiday, 2000, p. 80). The CEH concluded that more than 200,000 
persons had died or disappeared during the armed conflict, of whom 80 percent were Mayan, and 
95 percent of these cases were carried out by the armed forces. Additionally, the CEH concluded 
that the period of the war between 1981 and 1983 resulted in genocide against the highland 
Mayan communities carried out by the state in the context of counterinsurgency operations. The 
report contained 84 recommendations, a majority of which were for the Guatemalan government, 
including reparations for victims, fostering a culture of respect and observance of human rights, 
and strengthening the democratic process (MINUGUA, 2002). The CEH’s recommendations 
were not well received by the Guatemalan government, which argued that many of the 
recommendations had already been implemented and that others were already underway, which 
was in most cases untrue. The government’s attitude towards the CEH’s report inspired little 





Role of Third Parties 
Third parties played a pivotal role in the Guatemalan conflict and peace process. During 
the conflict, US support contributed immensely to the strength of the Guatemalan army and its 
ability to suppress popular uprisings, while the communist bloc’s role was practically 
nonexistent. During the peace process, the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC) immensely 
contributed to the peace agreement by providing civil society’s stance on the different matters 
that the negotiating parties discussed. The ASC provided a different outlook to the peace talks 
and allowed Guatemalan society to have a voice in the peace process shaping the future of the 
country. The Friends of the UN Secretary General also facilitated the peace negotiations in a 
much more limited way than did the Assembly.  In all, these three third parties played important 
roles in shaping the conflict and peace process.  
The United States 
The US role in the conflict in Guatemala was most noticeable in its role in supporting the 
CIA-backed coup that removed Jacobo Arbenz from power. The coup was a reaction to the 
reforms that the Arbenz government attempted to implement, many of which would have 
addressed some of the sources of inequality and disenfranchisement existent in Guatemala. What 
followed the US-backed removal of Arbenz was an intricate system of US support for the 
government and armed forces justified by the US to prevent Guatemala from becoming another 
Cuba. The US poured endless resources to training and reorganizing the Guatemalan army so 
that it could better suppress the insurgency, transforming the Guatemalan army into an 
unmatchable counterinsurgency force (Jonas, 1996, p. 148). However, the atrocities carried out 
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by the Guatemalan army made overt US support impossible, especially during the armed forces’ 
scorched-earth campaign between 1978 and 1983 (Sieder, 2001, p. 187).  
The US overt support for the Guatemalan government was suspended as a reaction to the 
human rights violations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. There is still limited information on 
the covert support the Guatemalan government and armed forces received from the US to 
continue their counterinsurgency operations. In 1995, reports emerged that linked a high ranking 
Guatemalan military officer to the murder of an American citizen, Michael DeVine, and a 
guerrilla commander, Efrain Bamaca, who was married to American lawyer Jennifer Harbury. 
Colonel Julio Alpirez was not only a member of the Guatemalan armed forces but was also on 
the CIA payroll. The Harbury case signaled that the extent to which the US was involved in the 
Guatemalan civil war remains unknown. The CIA’s failure to declassify additional files 
pertaining to its work during the Guatemalan conflict leads to the assumption that the Harbury 
case was only the tip of the iceberg (Jonas, 2000b, p. 124). In 1999, President Clinton publicly 
apologized for the role the US played supporting the military forces and intelligence units that 
carried out the violence and repression in Guatemala. While President Clinton’s apology served 
as the US’s recognition of its involvement in the Guatemalan conflict, the extent of this 
involvement is still unknown.  
US interference during the peace process further complicated the peace transition in 
Guatemala. The peace process in Guatemala took place at a time of anti-UN sentiments in the 
US, when the US Congress had suspended its payment of UN dues and the US government was 
in the midst of a campaign to remove Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. The anti-UN climate 
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resulted in limited support for any UN involvement, including the Guatemalan mission, which as 
a result was poorly funded and was only able to begin its work through the approval of the 
General Assembly, since the Security Council failed to approve the mission (Jonas, 2000b, p. 
66). It is evident that MINUGUA’s timing proved to be an important handicap particularly in 
regards to the support it received from the US.  
The Communist Bloc 
According to the CIA report titled “Soviet Capabilities and Intentions in Latin America” 
published on 14 November 1950, the Soviet Union utilized its connection with local communist 
parties to promote its interests and reduce solidarity between Latin American states and the US. 
The report states that in the case of Guatemala, the Soviet influence caused conflict between 
political factions leading to political instability. Moreover, the report argues that Guatemalan 
communists supported the President Juan Jose Arevalo (previous administration to that of 
Arbenz) to ensure that the next administration would embrace their communist ideals. In 
addition, the influence Communists had in the education system in Guatemala, presented a threat 
to regional stability because it developed student or youth movements that were susceptible to 
Soviet influence (Central Intelligence Agency, 1950). Furthermore, a memorandum sent to the 
Director of Intelligence on 22 December 1953 titled “Subject Information on Guatemala” states 
that top Guatemalan Communists were trained in the Soviet Union. According to this 
memorandum, Communists had significant influence on the Arbenz administration, which 
utilized the influence of the Communist Party “to put into effect what he labels his ‘social 
reform’” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1953). Even though these are the official statements 
made by the CIA regarding Soviet influence in Guatemala, there is limited scholarly reference to 
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the Soviet involvement in the country. The majority of the literature regarding the years leading 
up to the civil war and the war itself do not mention the Soviet Union as an influential player in 
the conflict. Even though US policy used the threat of Soviet influence as justification for their 
involvement in Guatemala at the time, there was no evidence of Soviet involvement in the 
country (Cohen, 1993, p. 104). 
Assembly of Civil Society 
The Assembly of Civil Society (ASC) was established during the peace process as a body 
to represent the interests of civil society during the peace negotiations under the January 1994 
Framework Accord. The ASC represented all organized sectors of civil society, including 
women’s organizations for the first time. The ASC’s legitimacy resulted from its diversity and 
plurality of political ideologies represented within the organization (Krznaric, 1999, p. 1). The 
ASC produced recommendations that it submitted to the negotiating parties on the different 
issues to be addressed. Also, the ASC evaluated the signed accords on the different issues to 
facilitate their future implementation. The ASC was the only party to produce its working papers 
on schedule and in many respects the final peace accords are a close reflection of many of the 
proposals introduced by the ASC over the peace process (Burgerman, 2000, p. 76). The ASC’s 
role during the peace process was extremely important and its non-exclusionary nature allowed 
for the popular participation of Guatemalan society, integrating sectors of society that 
historically had limited access to the political process.  
Friends of the UN Secretary General 
Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the US and Venezuela comprised the Friends of the 
UN Secretary General, a group of countries that assisted the UN and the Secretary General in 
67 
 
facilitating the peace process between the Guatemalan government and the URNG. Their role in 
the Guatemalan peace process was limited to logistical issues including hosting the peace talks 
and assisting with the travel arrangements for the negotiating parties. While their assistance 
helped the peace process run more smoothly, their contributions to the peace process as a whole 
were limited.  
Post MINUGUA Guatemala 
MINUGUA’s role in the Guatemalan peace process was restricted because of limited 
support from the international community, the Guatemalan government and armed forces. 
MINUGUA was created in an international environment that discouraged UN intervention. The 
mission was established in a country that despite experiencing a devastating conflict, failed to 
whole heartedly embrace the peace process and the changes necessary to build sustainable peace. 
MINUGUA’s work was divided into four distinct divisions that tackled different areas of the 
peace process, including: verification, good offices, technical assistance and public information. 
Of the four divisions, only the verification division had an active role in assisting and facilitating 
the peace process, while the remaining three served minor advisory roles. The work of 
MINUGUA was limited, making the mission more similar to a traditional peacekeeping mission 
than a peace building mission. The role of the mission was limited to verifying the 
implementation of the peace accords and minor tasks that helped with the execution. However, 
as successful as MINUGUA might have been in its limited role in Guatemala, the leading causes 
that resulted in the 36 years civil war were not necessarily addressed by the UN mission, making 
the underlying causes of the war a major concern for the sustainability of peace and democracy 
in Guatemala.  
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MINUGUA successfully supervised the demilitarization of the URNG and the collection 
of the weapons utilized by the insurgent group during the war. While the demobilization process 
was deemed a success, the resurgence of violence in the country is alarming. The prevalence of 
organized crime in Guatemala, including drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery, 
and car theft, often through the use of high-powered arms has been especially disturbing. 
Furthermore, the rise of youth gangs in rural and urban areas is cause for great concern (Kincaid, 
2000, p. 49). The heightened crime rate has strained the peace process as the Guatemalan 
government searches for adequate measures that might mitigate the country’s violent streak. The 
government’s reaction may lead to greater concerns, since the remilitarization of the police force 
as a source of security may return Guatemala to the repression that was experienced in the years 
leading up to and during the war.  
In addition to an alarming rise in violence, Guatemala’s human rights record has been 
dubious. Human rights groups have raised concerns on the status of human rights in Guatemala, 
particularly in reference to the treatment of journalists and activists. Furthermore, there have 
been reports of death squads continuing to operate in rural areas (Paris, 2002, p. 57). In 1998, the 
Roman Catholic Church published a four volume study titled “Guatemala: Never Again,” which 
detailed the impact of the violence of the war on Guatemalan society. Following the release of 
the report, Juan Gerardi, the bishop tasked with overseeing the project, was brutally assassinated 
in his Guatemala City residence (Holiday, 2000, p. 80). The Gerardi assassination is an example 
of the violence that continues to exist in Guatemala. In addition, the accords have failed to 
address the deeply institutionalized racism that plagues Guatemala, an essential step for true 
reconciliation. Guatemala’s population is comprised of 60 percent of indigenous groups that 
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must be incorporated into social, economic and political life to begin to address some of the 
underlying causes that led to the conflict in the first place.    
Since the end of the civil war, Guatemala has held four free and fair general elections. 
The country has been able to maintain a stable democracy since the signing of the peace 
agreement. According to data from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Survey, which 
measures both political rights and civil liberties in countries around the world on a scale of 1-7 (1 
being the highest degree of freedom and 7 being the lowest), Guatemala’s civil liberties have 
remained constant at 4, deemed by the survey as partially free, since the end of the civil war. 
Political rights have fluctuated since the end of the war, seeing partial improvement during the 
five years following the signing of the peace accords and deteriorating in the early 2000s and 
again in 2009. Unfortunately, the data is not available to compare the post war levels of political 
rights and civil liberties to those prior to the war in the 1950s. Freedom House only began 
collecting data for this survey in the 1970s, ten years after the start of the war. However, it is 
important to note that during the early 1970s, Guatemala’s indicators were at a score of 2, the 
highest level of freedom reached since that time. The higher levels of freedom present after a 
decade of war have not been achieved in post-war Guatemala. Furthermore, it is important to 
note that these positive levels in the 1970s were prior to the scorched earth war carried out by the 
Guatemalan army in the late 1970s and early 1980s, reflected in the graph by a significant drop 
in both political rights and civil liberties to the lowest level of freedom recorded in Guatemala’s 




Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Survey 1972-2011 
Figure 5: Political Rights in Guatemala 
 
 
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World Survey 1972-2011 
Figure 6: Civil Liberties in Guatemala 
 
The peace accords included a socio-economic accord that outlined measures to reduce 























Guatemalan government has implemented its responsibilities as outlined in the accords 
sporadically and over longer periods of time than expected. Furthermore, the interest of 
conservative business in Guatemala has influenced the government, which has delayed the 
implementation process (Paris, 2002, p. 58). While the data on Guatemala’s GNI per capita 
shows that there has been some improvement since the signing of the peace accords, the rise in 
this economic indicator has been moderate to say the least, which is far from sufficient in a 
country plagued with poverty and inequality. Furthermore, in a country with such 
institutionalized inequality as that of Guatemala, modest GNI per capita increases are 
insignificant when addressing the economic reality of the majority of the population. Failure to 
successfully address inequality can result in recurring social unrest as has often been the case in 
Guatemala.  Additionally, it is important to note that the Human Development Index, developed 
by the UN Development Programs, which measures a long healthy life, access to education and a 
decent standard of living, has increased insignificantly since the end of the war, a reflection of 
the continued difficulties faced by the population in post-civil war Guatemala as seen in Figure 8. 
The majority of Guatemalans have not seen improvement in their standard of living as is 
reflected in Figure 7 and 8, a reality that is of particular concern considering that the country’s 




Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
Figure 7: GNI per Capita in Guatemala 
 
 
Source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), International Human Development Indicators. 
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Guatemala’s post conflict environment shows mixed results. While the country has 
sustained peace and has refrained from returning to the violence experienced during the civil war, 
this peace has been shadowed by increasing levels of violence. Rising levels of violence have led 
to a governmental reaction that has called on security forces to better implement their security 
agenda, a request that may result in the resurgence of the oppression experienced during the civil 
war. Furthermore, the government’s inability or unwillingness to tackle the country’s inequality 
has remained a major concern that may lead to an outbreak of violence as previously seen in 
Guatemala’s history. The recurring violence and sustained lack of equitable economic growth 
have remained the major concerns in post-civil war Guatemala and the major issues that may 
threaten the sustained peace in the country. 
MINUGUA’s role in verification provided the means to disarm the URNG and assist in 
their reintegration to society. The disarmament of the insurgent group was done mostly at face 
value, without the means to further investigate whether or not the URNG had indeed fully 
disarmed. Furthermore, combatants have not been able to fully integrate into civil society 
because of the dire economic situation, making them part of an already vulnerable population. 
Experts have argued that it is this lack of economic opportunities that has forced ex-URNG 
combatants into organized crime, which could serve as an explanation for the increased levels of 
violence witnessed in Guatemala in recent times. The violence has yielded a strong reaction from 
the government, which threatens to return the country to repression and oppression by military 
forces. In the case of Guatemala, it appears that the causes that led to the civil war are viciously 
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interconnected and their escalation in recent times may result in a resurgence of violence more 




CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSION  
Differences between the Salvadoran and the Guatemalan Conflicts 
The civil war in El Salvador lasted 12 years and resulted in the death of 75,000 
Salvadorans, while the conflict in Guatemala lasted three times as long and the death toll was 2.5 
times that of the Salvadoran conflict. The conflict in El Salvador was shorter but maintained a 
higher level of intensity, whereas the conflict in Guatemala extended over three decades, with 
varying levels of intensity over the years. There is an important difference between the length 
and intensity of both conflicts; however, the results in both El Salvador and Guatemala included 
the vast destruction of infrastructure, massive loss of life, the suppression of political and civil 
rights, and significant violations of human rights.  
Some of the conflicts’ contributing factors included social, economic and political 
systems that instigated inequality caused by a small, landowning elites that dominated the 
economic and political systems. These powerful minorities in El Salvador and Guatemala 
benefited from a closed economic system, while the majority of the population lived in poverty 
and struggled to survive. In both countries, inequality was exacerbated by the establishment of 
large coffee plantations, which expropriated land from subsistence farmers and accumulated it in 
the hands of the already powerful landed elite. In the years prior to the start of the conflict, both 
El Salvador and Guatemala attempted to implement agrarian reforms to tackle the vast inequality 
in the country by buying land from large landowners and granting these lands to landless 
peasants. These reforms were opposed by the landowning elite in both countries, who saw their 
economic interests threatened by these measures. These failed agrarian reforms led to 
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confrontation between the elite and the peasantry, leading to an increase in violence and the 
establishment of insurgency groups with popular support. In Guatemala, the attempt at agrarian 
reform resulted in the CIA-backed coup that removed President Arbenz from power and resulted 
in a series of military backed administrations. In El Salvador, the surge in violence had forced 
the government to attempt agrarian reform, but when the reform failed, violence and popular 
uprisings increased; however, the US did not intervene. US interests in Guatemala at the time of 
the agrarian reform were more significant than those in El Salvador. American based UFCO 
would have suffered important reductions in its land and was to receive a smaller remuneration 
than it had expected, which resulted in the US intervention to protect the interests of the 
company.  
The FMLN in El Salvador was stronger and better organized, presenting a real challenge 
to the state’s monopoly of violence. The FMLN was able to stand its ground over the years, 
presenting a legitimate threat to the power of the Salvadoran army and the government’s 
stability. The URNG, however, never presented a legitimate threat to the Guatemalan army. 
Another difference in the intensity of the conflict was the power of the armed forces. The 
Salvadoran army was well-organized and well-funded but it was still unable to defeat the FMLN 
militarily. The balance of power between the FMLN and the Salvadoran armed forces was 
somewhat equitable. The Guatemalan armed forces were strong, well-trained, and well-
organized with important financial backing from the Guatemalan and US governments. The 
Guatemalan army was one of the best trained and most efficient in the region. The URNG did 
not present a legitimate threat to the Guatemalan armed forces, making the conflict in Guatemala 
significantly more asymmetrical than that in El Salvador.  
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Either conflict resulted in a military victory by neither of the parties involved. However, 
the conflict in El Salvador did reach a point of stagnation when both parties recognized their 
inability to accomplish a military victory, forcing both parties to the negotiating table. 
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and changes in the international arena facilitated the 
decision to negotiate, especially on the part of the Salvadoran government. In the case of 
Guatemala, domestic and international pressure led both parties to the negotiating table. The 
Guatemalan army refused to negotiate, recognizing its implicit superiority in force opposite to 
the URNG. When the Guatemalan government finally acceded to negotiations, the power 
asymmetry that existed during the conflict translated to the negotiating table. As a result, the 
URNG’s influence during the negotiations was limited.  
Differences between the Salvadoran and the Guatemalan peace negotiations 
The negotiations leading up to the peace agreements in El Salvador and Guatemala 
differed in the existing power dynamics between the negotiating parties. In the case of El 
Salvador, the FMLN and the government viewed each other as equals. In the case of Guatemala, 
the URNG was much weaker than its Salvadoran counterpart, which limited its influence during 
negotiations. The timing of the two negotiations also varied significantly. El Salvador’s conflict 
reached the stage of negotiations almost in concordance with the end of the Cold War, which 
resulted in strong support for a negotiated solution from pivotal international players including 
the US and the UN. In the case of Guatemala, the parties reached the negotiating table at a time 
where international involvement in civil conflicts was discouraged, which limited the support 
and involvement of international players during the negotiations.  
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Another difference between the two negotiation processes was the role played by the UN 
and the Secretary General. In the case of El Salvador, Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar was 
fully committed and dedicated to the peace process, taking a personal interest in the negotiations 
and committing to the peaceful resolution to the conflict. Pérez de Cuéllar facilitated the peace 
process personally and through his good offices, playing a pivotal and influential role when 
negotiations reached standstills. In the case of Guatemala, the role of Secretary General Boutros-
Ghali was extremely limited. There is no evidence that the Secretary General took a personal 
interest in the Guatemalan peace process as did Pérez de Cuéllar in El Salvador. Furthermore, 
during the peace negotiations in Guatemala, Boutros-Ghali was in the midst of an aggressive 
campaign against him by the US government, focusing his attention on defending his position as 
Secretary General rather than facilitating the peace process in Guatemala.  
The difference in the UN involvement in both cases is also evident in the role the 
organization played during the negotiations. In the case of El Salvador, the UN served as 
mediator and negotiator. Álvarode Soto, as representative of the Secretary General, played a 
pivotal role in making proposals to the negotiating parties and even writing sections of the 
accords. In the case of Guatemala, the UN served as mediator and its role was limited in scope, 
especially when compared to the organization’s role in El Salvador. Even though both the 
URNG and the Guatemalan government agreed to allow the UN to propose measures and 
initiatives during the negotiations, the contributions made by the UN were limited beyond the 
role of mediator and neutral third party.  
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In the case of Guatemala, the ASC played a crucial role during negotiations as the 
representative of civil society. The ASC provided the input from civil organizations from 
Guatemala, providing written proposals for each of the accords leading up to the final peace 
agreement. The ASC played a critical role in the negotiations and gave a voice to a large number 
of civil groups who would have otherwise had no input in the final peace agreement. Even 
though the role of the ASC was important in Guatemala, it was different in scope from the 
supportive role played by the UN in El Salvador. The power of the UN, backed by the support of 
the international community in the Salvadoran peace process, was central in reaching a peace 
agreement. 
The peace accords reached during the negotiations in El Salvador and Guatemala were 
very different in nature. To begin with, the FMLN was a stronger negotiator, which allowed it to 
take a harder stance on issues to accomplish its goals. The URNG on the other hand, did not have 
the strength of the FMLN, which made its position extremely weak. In addition, the Guatemalan 
peace agreement included economic accords to deal with the inequality and poverty in the 
country as well as establishing a new development model to lift the country out of poverty. The 
agreement was reached with the help of international financial organizations, including the IMF 
and the World Bank. In the case of El Salvador, the economic agreement was not addressed until 
the last days of negotiations, which yielded a basic agreement that called for the establishment of 
a committee to deal with the economic issues later. Additionally, the Guatemalan peace accords 
included an agreement on indigenous rights as a result of the deep racial divide that plagued the 
country and the violence towards the Mayan communities during the war. In the case of El 
Salvador, the violence during the war had not targeted the indigenous communities. It is 
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important to note that the demographics of both countries regarding their indigenous populations 
is extremely different. Whereas in El Salvador 1 percent of the population is indigenous, 9 
percent European and 90 percent mestizo, in Guatemala, 40 percent of the population is 
indigenous, while 60 percent in mestizo or European. Evidently, the racial and ethnic divides in 
Guatemala were more significant than in El Salvador. In comparison, the Guatemalan peace 
accord was more complex in that it included an economic plan for the country and addressed 
issues regarding the country’s ethnic populations, however, these additions to the accords did not 
result in greater economic development or stability for Guatemala because most of the economic 
provisions provided for a liberal market economy that failed to protect the most vulnerable 
sectors of the population and most provisions addressing ethnic populations failed to be 
implemented. 
Differences between ONUSAL and MINUGUA 
The differences between ONUSAL and MINUGUA contributed to the different results 
the UN had in both El Salvador and Guatemala. From the beginning, the support the missions 
received from the international community was extremely different. El Salvador's mission was 
approved by the Security Council at Pérez de Cuéllar's request. ONUSAL was established during 
a time of renewed faith in the work of the UN and openness to international intervention. 
MINUGUA failed to receive support from the Security Council. The General Assembly was 
forced to approve the mandate of MINUGUA, which made the mission weaker than its 
Salvadoran counterpart and broke with one of the guidelines of traditional peacekeeping, which 
requires Security Council approval. MINUGUA was established following the UN’s failed 
interventions in Rwanda, Somalia, and Yugoslavia. At the time of the Guatemalan peace process, 
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the international community was skeptical of the role the UN could play in internal conflicts, 
which is reflected in the lack of support for MINUGUA.  
Both ONUSAL and MINUGUA began their work prior to the final agreement and cease-
fire, both differing from the traditional peacekeeping framework that requires an established 
cease fire. ONUSAL began its work in human rights verification six months prior to the final 
peace agreement, while MINUGUA started working in Guatemala two years prior to the final 
accords. Both missions began their work on the ground at the negotiating parties’ request. 
ONUSAL received the support of the Salvadoran government and the FMLN and even though 
the mission faced some logistical difficulties during its early stages it was openly welcomed by 
Salvadoran society. MINUGUA faced a more hostile environment on the ground, with attacks on 
the mission and its headquarters. In addition, the Guatemalan government and armed forces did 
not facilitate MINUGUA's work. The UN missions in El Salvador and Guatemala were divided 
into four divisions. These divisions specialized on different areas of the peace accords to 
facilitate their implementations. ONUSAL included a military, police, electoral, and human 
rights division. MINUGUA included a verification, good offices, technical assistance, and public 
information division.  
ONUSAL's military and human rights divisions were charged with similar work to that of 
MINUGUA's verification division. ONUSAL's military division was tasked with demilitarizing 
the FMLN and its human rights division was tasked with human rights verification prior to and 
following the peace accords. MINUGUA's verification division was charged with these same 
mandates. ONUSAL's military division was composed of 4,948 military observers while 
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MINUGUA's verification mission was composed of 155 military observers. There is a significant 
difference in the number of observers, which made the similar tasks carried out by both divisions 
significantly more challenging for MINUGUA. ONUSAL's demilitarization process included 
approximately 7,000 FMLN combatants, while MINUGUA's demilitarization process included 
under 3,000 URNG combatants. ONUSAL’s demilitarization process counted 1 UN staffer for 
every 1.5 FMLN insurgent, whereas MINUGUA’s demilitarization process counted 1 UN staffer 
for every 20 URNG insurgents. ONUSAL faced some logistical and scheduling challenges 
during the demilitarization process; however, through active UN mediation between the FMLN 
and the government, the mission was able to overcome these difficulties to successfully 
accomplish its mandate. MINUGUA's demobilization process included the removal of landmines 
that had been placed over the course of the war. The UN mission in Guatemala was not equipped 
or manned to deal with the demining process, so it needed the help of both the URNG and the 
government. Both ONUSAL and MINUGUA were successful in demobilizing the insurgent 
groups, however, both missions lacked the resources necessary to guarantee that both the FMLN 
and URNG had demobilized completely. 
ONUSAL and MINUGUA’s human rights verification began prior to the final peace 
accords. ONUSAL’s presence in El Salvador helped decrease the number of human rights 
violations. Additionally, ONUSAL helped establish institutions, like the Human Rights 
Ombudsman’s Office, that would promote human rights after the end of the mission’s mandate. 
In addition, ONUSAL worked with civil organizations to create programs that educated the 
public on human rights. MINUGUA’s work in Guatemala began in a more challenging 
environment than that faced by its Salvadoran counterpart. The mission was not well-received by 
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the armed forces, sectors of the government, and sectors of the elite, which made the work of 
MINUGUA more difficult. The UN mission in Guatemala focused on verifying human rights on 
the ground and investigating human rights complaints. In addition, MINUGUA produced a series 
of reports documenting the human rights reality in Guatemala. Both ONUSAL and MINUGUA 
played an important role in decreasing human rights violations on the ground. Both missions’ 
presences ameliorated the human rights realities following the civil war. In the long term, 
however, ONUSAL’s institution building work contributed to a decrease in human rights 
violation in El Salvador when compared to Guatemala.  
ONUSAL’s police and electoral divisions’ mandate included hands-on work that 
facilitated the electoral process and the creation of the PNC. Both these divisions played crucial 
roles in post-war El Salvador. The electoral division’s work guaranteed that the post-war 
elections in El Salvador were inclusive, free and fair. This division’s work went beyond its 
original mandate of supervision and took on tasks that included voter registration, campaign 
supervision, election supervision and vote counting. The police division helped establish and 
train the civilian police force tasked with domestic security in El Salvador. The PNC was 
essential in reducing the role of the armed forces, and ONUSAL’s police division assisted with 
the transition towards a civilian police force. In the case of Guatemala, post-war elections and 
the establishment of a civilian police force were imperative issues that would determine the 
peaceful transition to democracy following the civil war. However, MINUGUA did not 
supervise these matters as ONUSAL did in El Salvador. The Guatemalan government was tasked 
with carrying out the electoral process and establishing the new civilian police force.  
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MINUGUA’s division of good offices, technical assistance and public information served 
advisory roles during the post-war period. These offices were composed of experts in the 
respective areas to facilitate the transition to peace and democracy. These divisions’ work, while 
important, did not take an active role in the peace process. MINUGUA’s work was more 
superficial than ONUSAL’s. The hostilities the mission faced on the ground resulted with the 
limited work these divisions carried out in Guatemala. Additionally, MINUGUA faced 
difficulties from the international community’s changing attitude towards UN involvement, 
which resulted in the limited scope of its mandate in comparison to ONUSAL.  
ONUSAL and MINUGUA started working on the ground prior to the signing of the final 
peace accords and establishment of an official cease fire. Both missions were charged with 
facilitating the demobilization process of the insurgency groups and verifying human rights. 
However, the remainder of the work carried out by ONUSAL and MINUGUA was extremely 
different. ONUSAL carried out tangible tasks that facilitated the peace process, including the 
establishment of human rights institutions, the creation and training of a civilian police force and 
the supervision of the electoral process. MINUGUA’s role in post-war Guatemala was limited to 
an advisory position outside of its verification division. The technical assistance, good offices 
and public information divisions served mostly as mediators and advisors, opposite to the active 
role played by the electoral and police divisions in El Salvador.  
Differences between the El Salvador and the Guatemala Truth Commissions 
Both peace accords agreed on the creation of truth commissions to conduct formal 
investigations of the violence and human rights violations committed during the conflict. The 
goal of both Commissions was to shed light on the crimes committed during the war to begin the 
85 
 
reconciliation process. The Salvadoran Commission was composed of three foreign nationals to 
avoid conflicting interests during the investigation and report period. In the case of Guatemala, 
the Commission was composed of one foreign national and two Guatemalan nationals. Both 
Commissions were tasked with investigating crimes that were part of a systematic pattern of 
violence. An important difference between the two Commissions was that the Commission in El 
Salvador was tasked with investigating and naming those responsible for these violent crimes. 
The Salvadoran Commission did not have prosecutorial powers, but its ability to identify those 
guilty of human rights violations almost served as a judicial proclamation of guilt. The 
Guatemalan Commission investigated violent and systematic crimes that took place during the 
civil war. However, the Guatemalan Commission was not allowed to name those responsible for 
these crimes. The Commission’s inability to name those who had perpetuated the violence and 
human rights violations during the war perpetuated the country’s culture of impunity.  
Both Commissions drafted reports that described their findings and included 
recommendations to be implemented by the national governments and armed forces. Both 
Commissions reported that 95 percent of the violent crimes had been committed by the armed 
forces and only 5 percent were carried out by the insurgency groups. Additionally, the 
Guatemalan Commission found that between 1981 and 1983, the counterinsurgency operations 
carried out by the Guatemalan government had systematically targeted the highland Mayan 
communities, resulting in the mass murder of the indigenous population and genocide (80 
percent of those murdered were of indigenous decent). While the levels of violence were 
alarming in both civil wars, the Guatemalan civil war included ethnic cleansing that perpetuated 
the established ethnic cleavages in the country.  
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Both Commissions made recommendations to be implemented by the governments to 
prevent such violence from recurring. These recommendations were not immediately embraced 
by the governments. The Salvadoran government took action regarding the reform of the judicial 
system and implemented basic democratic rights. However, it delayed the recommendations that 
called for the removal of an important number of officials from the armed forces’ officer corps. 
In the case of Guatemala, the government argued that most of the recommendations made by the 
Commission had already been implemented and the rest of the recommendations were in the 
process of being implemented. The Guatemalan government’s reaction to the Commission’s 
recommendations made the international community further question the government’s 
commitment to the peace process.  
Differences in the role of third parties in El Salvador and Guatemala 
Third parties played important roles in both El Salvador and Guatemala. In both cases, 
the United States played a critical role in the development, maintenance and ending of the 
conflicts. At the same time, the role of the Communist bloc was more prominent in El Salvador, 
where reports of the bloc’s involvement in Guatemala are limited to reports by the US 
government. The Contadora Group set the groundwork for the negotiations in El Salvador, while 
in the case of Guatemala the role of the Assembly of Civil Society was prominent during 
negotiations. Finally, the Friends of the UN Secretary General helped facilitate the peace process 
by providing assistance to the UN during this particular period of time.  
In the Salvadoran and Guatemalan conflicts, the US supported financially and militarily 
the governments in power. However, in the case of Guatemala the role of the US was much more 
intricate and involved. The US took part in the removal of democratically elected president 
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Jacobo Arbenz, trained the Guatemalan armed forces in counter-insurgency operations, and 
provided covert support for the government and armed forces. To date, there is still limited 
information on how intricate and far-reaching the role of the US was during the Guatemalan 
conflict. Evidently, in both cases the role of the US helped prolong the conflict because of the 
indisputable support the American government provided to the Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
governments. However, in the case of Guatemala, US involvement was much more intricate, far-
reaching and sustained. 
The role the communist bloc played in both conflicts was limited. In the case of El 
Salvador, there is evidence that the FMLN received support from the communist bloc, including 
the USSR and Nicaragua’s Sandinistas. In the case of Guatemala, the role of the communist bloc 
is more limited, since evidence of its involvement is limited to documents and reports by US 
intelligence. There is limited information on the role of the different communist parties in the 
Guatemalan conflict in academic papers or historical records. Evidently, the levels of 
involvement of the US and the communist bloc in both conflicts helped create a more 
symmetrical conflict in the case of El Salvador, while the different levels of support received by 
the Guatemalan government from the US and lack of support for the URNG by the communist 
bloc created a more asymmetrical conflict that led to alarmingly higher levels of violence when 
compared to the Salvadoran conflict.  
In the case of the Contadora Group in El Salvador, it facilitated the transition to the 
negotiating table by helping establish the necessary conditions that would lead to negotiations. 
The Contadora’s success, however, was limited because of its regional approach, which failed to 
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target each of the parties involved in the Central American conflicts independently and not just 
collectively. While the group’s work did not conclude in the regional peace agreements that it 
expected, it did pave the way to peace in the region through its diplomatic work with the parties 
involved. The role of the Assembly of Civil Society was significant once negotiations in 
Guatemala were underway. The ACS represented the different civil groups during the 
negotiation process. The ACS was an important contributor to the final peace agreement, giving 
civil society a stronger voice in the peace process that was the case in El Salvador.  
The Friends of the UN Secretary General served in both El Salvador and Guatemala as an 
extension of the work of the UN and the good offices of the Secretary General. States that were 
part of this group facilitated the negotiation process by arranging travel and security for the 
negotiating parties, helping the peace process run more smoothly. In the case of El Salvador, 
with Pérez de Cuéllar playing a more prominent role in the peace process, the Friends were more 
involved during negotiations. The Friends not only helped with the logistical aspects of the peace 
process but also met with the negotiating parties to discuss their grievances and concerns. In the 
case of Guatemala, even if the number of states that made up the Friends was more significant, 
their role was limited to facilitating the logistical aspects of the negotiations rather than a more 
active role as was the case of the Friends in El Salvador.  
Differences in post ONUSAL El Salvador and post MINUGUA Guatemala 
El Salvador and Guatemala have both returned to civilian rule through the democratic 
election of their officials. Both countries have continued to hold free and fair elections that have 
maintained democratic rule. In the case of political rights, the reality in El Salvador and 
Guatemala has differed. In El Salvador, political rights have returned to pre-civil war levels and 
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have been maintained at the same levels since the mid-1990s as seen in Figure 1. El Salvador’s 
political rights’ ranking is deemed free by Freedom House. In Guatemala, political rights have 
failed to remain stable. The level of political rights has fluctuated between levels 3 and 4 as seen 
in Figure 5, deemed partially free by Freedom House. El Salvador has reached an important level 
of stability and freedom in the area of political rights in the two decades following the end of the 
war. Guatemala has struggled to guarantee the political rights of its citizens following the end of 
the civil war. With regards to civil liberties, El Salvador, as seen in Figure 2, reached a level 3 in 
this area deemed free by Freedom House. This level mirrors that of civil liberties in the country 
prior to the civil war. In the case of Guatemala, civil liberties saw some improvement in 
comparison to the last five years of the war, however, they have failed to return to the higher 
levels that it had reached even during the war. At a level 4, civil liberties in Guatemala are 
deemed partially free by Freedom House.  
In the case of economic indicators, both countries have maintained an upward trend in 
GNI per capita. The increase in El Salvador has been more significant than the increase in 
Guatemala. In El Salvador, GNI per capita in constant 2000 US dollars has increased from $1500 
at the end of the war to $2500 in 2010, a two thirds increase in almost two decades. In 
Guatemala, the increase in GNI per capita has been more modest, increasing from $1400 
constant 2000 US dollars in 1995 to $1800 in 2010, a one third increase. While the increase in 
GNI per capita shows economic growth in both countries, the Human Development Index in 
both countries show that the improvement in quality of life in both El Salvador and Guatemala 
has been extremely modest. In these countries, where the levels of poverty and inequality have 
traditionally been extremely high, economic development alone will fail to provide for the 
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poorest sections of the population. Redistributive measures through government spending are 
necessary to reach higher levels of equality. In the case of El Salvador, the HDI has improved 
from .5 to .7 since the end of the war. In Guatemala, the improvement in HDI has been more 
limited, from .5 to .6 since the end of the war. Evidently, the improved economic conditions in El 
Salvador are reflected in the improvement in HDI, whereas in Guatemala, the improvement has 
been more limited. Additionally, it is important to note that Guatemala faced additional 
challenges in post-civil war years regarding the marginalization of large sectors of the 
population, which is likely to have played a role in the limited HDI improvement.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the differences in the role played by the UN in post-civil war El Salvador 
and Guatemala were more significant than the author had expected at the start of this research 
project. Furthermore, the role of external factors had a much more significant impact on the role 
the UN played in both peace processes than what the author had anticipated. In the case of El 
Salvador, the work of the UN benefited from ideal timing when the end of the Cold War 
promoted greater UN involvement and an end to conflicts that reflected Cold War politics. The 
mission in El Salvador was the first mission to include a variety of peacebuilding strategies to 
facilitate the post-civil war reconstruction. The UN took a leading role in bringing both parties to 
the negotiating table, facilitating the peace talks, and working on the ground in a variety of areas 
from disarmament to electoral processes to guarantee that El Salvador had a successful return to 
peace, stability and democracy. The involvement of the UN in El Salvador was intricate and far-
reaching. ONUSAL was supported not only by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN, but 
also by the international community including the United States and UN as a whole. ONUSAL 
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was created at a time of renewed interest in UN international involvement following the 
stagnation the organization experienced during the Cold War years, ideal timing for a mission 
charged with implementing a diverse number of tasks to facilitate the peace process.  
The case of Guatemala, on the other hand, was very different. To begin with, the conflict 
in Guatemala had lasted three times as much as that in El Salvador and had yielded higher levels 
of violence. The Guatemalan civil war was also more asymmetrical in force, with stronger armed 
forces that carried out genocide and crimes against humanity during certain periods of the 
conflict. By the time the Guatemalan conflict moved to the negotiating table, the international 
community’s commitment to international involvement had dwindled. Following the failures in 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, UN involvement was no longer supported by the international 
community. MINUGUA faced challenges from the start, failing to gain Security Council support 
and resorting to General Assembly approval instead. This change in tides is exemplified by the 
role MINUGUA played in the Guatemalan peace process; the mission’s divisions were less 
involved and limited to advisory and supervisory roles. With the exception of MINUGUA’s 
verification division, the remainder of the mission served an extremely limited role in post-civil 
war Guatemala. Another difference worth noting was the different leadership at the UN at the 
time of the peace processes. In the case of El Salvador, Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar 
worked tirelessly to guarantee that the Salvadoran conflict was resolved before the end of his 
tenure. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali never showed the commitment to the Guatemalan peace 
process that his predecessor did to the Salvadoran peace process.  
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Finally, the author concludes from this research that the differences between ONUSAL 
and MINUGUA in the peace processes in El Salvador and Guatemala were very significant and 
could serve to explain the different realities facing both countries today. However, it is important 
to note that it was impossible to remove the missions from the context in which they took place 
and the factors that facilitated or hindered their work as the author had originally planned. In the 
case of El Salvador, the ideal timing of the peace process played an imperative role in facilitating 
the work of the UN and guaranteeing a smoother transition to peace. Contrary, in the case of 
Guatemala, the changing reality within the international community regarding UN involvement 
hindered MINUGUA and its work. MINUGUA was limited in scope when compared to its 
Salvadoran counterpart, which in combination with the different attitudes towards UN 
involvement and different levels of support for the peace process produced a less successful 
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